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INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent scholarship on international agreement design has almost exclusively focused 
on the public international law area.1 The literature on regime design in the area of 
international private law2 lacks a solid theoretical foundation. Academic writing on public 
international law’s state-centric approach is only amenable to crude transplantation and poses 
several puzzles in the international private law context. Resolving these puzzles is important 
because of the proliferation of transnational commercial agreements in areas that were 
traditionally the province of domestic law.3 This paper attempts to provide a starting point to 
address the theoretical vacuum. Part I argues that functionalist, liberal, and realist theories 
cannot fully explain transnational commercial law agreement design. Part II puts forth a 
demandeur-centric approach with the aid of examples that span the spectrum from hard law to 
soft law. Part III concludes that agreement design in transnational commercial law is premised 
on demandeur preferences and relative power. Ultimately, the choice of structure boils down 
to which parties are the demandeurs of the agreement.4 All else being equal, when the 
demandeurs are confident in their ability to achieve agreement and enforcement requires 
                                               
*
 Associate Professor of Law, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University. The author 
wishes to thank participants of a faculty presentation at the University of Denver for assistance in refining some 
ideas expressed in this article. The standard disclaimers about errors and omissions apply. 
1
 See, Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581 (2005); Jack 
Goldsmith & Eric Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 113 
(2003); Andrew Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579 (2005); Kenneth 
Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard Law and Soft Law in International Governance, INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); 
Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 499 (1999); and Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503 (1995). 
2
 The pioneering scholarship of scholars like Sir Roy Goode opened up many avenues for further research, but 
theoretical work continues to languish. See, Roy Goode, Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial 
Law, 46 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 1, 2 (1997); Roy Goode, Reflections on the Harmonization of Commercial Law, in 
Commercial and Consumer Law: National and International Dimensions 1-27 (Ross Cranston & Roy Goode 
eds., 1993). 
3
 Sandeep Gopalan, The creation of International Commercial Law: Sovereignty Felled?, 5 SAN DIEGO J. 
INT’L J.  267 (2004); The American Law Institute and UNIDROIT are working on drafting procedural rules that 
a country may adopt for the adjudication of disputes stemming from international commercial transactions, 
available at www.unidroit.org; See, UNCITRAL Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International 
Trade, http://www.uncitral.org/stable/res5681-e.pdf; UNIDROIT is currently in the advanced stages of 
transmitting a draft Space Protocol to the Cape Town Convention of 2001, available at www.unidroit.org; 
See, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, 1997. 
4
 When demandeurs need state involvement, primarily in terms of recognition, or enforcement assistance, they 
are likely to structure agreements as conventions provided that they possess sufficient political influence to attain 
ratification. 
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minimal state involvement, they will opt for non-convention vehicles.5 The choice of the 
convention form is predicated on their ability to co-opt states, when enforcement power is 
necessary.  
 
If, as contended, regime design is a function of demandeur preference, states have to 
be aware that they are ceding legislative power in significant areas to organizations that are 
not democratically elected, and difficult to access. Consultation in the agreement design 
process is frequently restricted to the membership, and even copies of the agreements are not 
available without paying a cost – a feature that sits uncomfortably with modern notions of 
participatory legislation and accessibility. It is not uncommon for some organizations to act 
like regulatory monopolies.6 There are serious consequences for states – legal business is 
monopolized by those with greater access to the demandeur, dispute resolution is often taken 
away from the jurisdiction of otherwise appropriate state courts or tribunals, state legislative 
power is eroded, the legal system might, after a time, possess very little expertise in an area 
because of a complete absence of relevant work for the local bar, and citizens are deprived of 
participation. 
 
I. THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW LENS 
 
Institutions in the private law area traditionally favored international conventions, 
assuming that because international conventions are binding, they are the strongest vehicle 
available.7 The use of conventions has been intrinsically linked to the emphasis on the 
bindingness of the obligations undertaken. In contrast, non-convention vehicles have been 
employed when the progenitors did not intend the agreement to be legally binding.8 Non-
convention vehicles have also been chosen when there was little need for state involvement.9 
                                               
5
 This is particularly exemplified by the behaviour of highly integrated commercial actors like the International 
Chamber of Commerce demanding transnational agreements and embodying them in non-convention forms with 
great success. 
6
 One might contend that these laws only apply in commercial transactions where the parties have the benefit of 
legal counsel, and that there is no element of coercion. Allowing sophisticated commercial parties to act in ways 
that maximise joint gains is in conformity with autonomy. To the extent that there are no externalities on third 
parties, these arguments might have some merit. However, it is disingenuous to believe that there are no 
externalities to parties subjecting themselves to agreements structured by demandeurs outside the pale of state 
regulation. 
7
 This view is embodied in article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties. Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, article 26: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith.” 
8
 An example of such intention is the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 1980, 
available at www.unidroit.org. For scholarly commentary on the Principles, see M.J. Bonnell, Do We Need a 
Global Commercial Code?, 106 DICK. L. R. 87-100 (2001). 
9
 An example is the ICC’s Incoterms, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/law/id315/index.html. 
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Accordingly, the scholarly treatment of the subject of the desirability of conventions 
as vehicles of international legislation has inextricably been linked to the question of 
compliance.10 While this focus may make sense in the public international law context, 
compliance has very little meaning in the private law area given the fact that many of these 
so-called binding conventions are dispositive.11 Dispositive means that an actor’s subsequent 
actions can render a convention non-binding. Parties are free to exclude the binding 
convention entirely or in part. Thus, while the traditional international law scholar would have 
concluded that the choice of a convention would enhance the “normative strength of the 
agreement and …a state’s sense of obligation”,12 reality does not support such a conclusion.  
 
For example, the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG)13 has been the law of the United States since 1988.14 Yet, it has had very little impact 
because most international contracts routinely exclude the convention’s application.15 The 
conventional explanation advanced for failed binding conventions, that states violate 
agreements when their interests conflict with the obligations embodied in the agreement, has 
no explanatory power for the failure of the CISG: few state interests of the United States 
conflict with CISG obligations, and the state plays little role in the success of such 
conventions. One might argue, however, that the United States has an interest in preserving 
the application of its own law to international contracts that would be subjected to the CISG, 
and that interest would conflict with the interest to ratify the CISG. This argument overlooks 
the role of party choice. Even if the United States has an interest in the application of its own 
domestic contracts law, there is no guarantee that its forbearance from ratifying the CISG 
would ensure that its domestic law would be applied to international contracts. The matter 
rests entirely in the hands of the contracting parties. Subject to minor limitations they are free 
to choose the law that governs their contracts, and they are not bound to apply the law of the 
                                               
10
 Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. Int’l L. 
113, 115 (2003). 
11
 See for example, the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980, article 6: 
“The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the 
effect of any of its provisions.” 
12
 Goldsmith and Posner, supra note 10, at _. 
13
 See United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.97/18, 19 I.L.M. 668 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG] (including sixty-six 
contracting states as of 2007, such as Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, France, Germany, Israel, Iraq, Italy, 
Mexico, Russia, and Spain), available at http:// www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (last visited --). The CISG is the 
culmination of over fifty years worth of work and was ratified in December 1986 by the United States. Id. 
14
 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html 
15
 Michael W. Gordon, Some Thoughts on the Receptiveness of Contract Rules in the CISG and UNIDROIT 
Principles as Reflected in One State’s (Florida) Experience of Law School Faculty, Members of the Bar with an 
International Practice, and Judges, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 361 (1998).  
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United States. Contractual choice, which is common across transnational commercial law, 
renders extremely problematic the applicability of conventional arguments from the field of 
public international law.16 
 
The application of rational choice theory to contracting parties, rather than states, 
explains why conventions succeed or fail. If the convention is precise in its terms on the 
ambits of cooperative action, contracting parties will find it hard to behave opportunistically 
and then turn around and claim that the opportunistic conduct did not violate the requirements 
of a cooperative game.17 The conclusion is similar in the context of coordination. Contracting 
parties subject themselves to a convention not because of the binding nature, but inter alia to 
assuage another party’s fear of being subject to a foreign legal system, because their interests 
might be better protected by the convention, and to reduce transaction costs. The binding 
nature does not add much value to either party, except insofar as it imposes some obligations 
on courts if a dispute arises.18 Routine exclusions of instruments like the CISG might be 
explained by path dependence19 and network externalities. Thus, although the CISG might be 
a better solution, a suboptimal uniformity continues to persist because contracting parties are 
reluctant to change their existing practices.20 
 
Public international law scholars argue that when structuring international agreements, 
states seek to enhance the credibility and enforceability of their agreements.21 These scholars 
analogize states to private contracting parties: states structure their agreements as contracts 
because they desire to make their promises binding. Thus compliance is crucial.22 This 
compliance is ensured by providing mechanisms that measure adherence and deviation. The 
                                               
16
 The situation becomes somewhat clearer if one shifts focus from compliance to subjection. Unlike compliance, 
which focuses on state action both at the ratification and implementation stages, subjection refers to the 
deployment of the convention as a source of authority by the parties to a legal relationship to which the 
convention applies. There has been little or no scholarly treatment of this concept and it is unclear why parties 
subject their agreements to transnational agreements. 
17
 Goldsmith and Posner, id. 
18
 This might be of limited utility if, as is common, the contract contains an arbitration clause. Even where the 
dispute is before a court, the binding nature of a convention can be stymied by interpretative devices aimed at 
applying domestic law. 
19
 Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd 
Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996).  Kahan and Klausner have suggested:  “that 
corporate contract terms can frequently offer ‘increasing returns’ as more firms employ the same contract term. 
Value arises from the common use of a contract term . . . . as the use of a term increases, it becomes significantly 
more attractive (at least up to a critical point), and its attraction becomes self-perpetuating.”  Id. at 348.  This 
results in standardization which is “a form of path dependence.”  Id. 
20
 Kahan & Klausner, supra note 19, at 349. Kahan and Klausner have suggested “that corporate contract terms 
can frequently offer "increasing returns" as more firms employ the same contract term. Value arises from the 
common use of a contract term… as the use of a term increases, it becomes significantly more attractive (at least 
up to a critical point), and its attraction becomes self-perpetuating.” 
21
 Andrew Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, supra note 6, 581.  
22
 Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, CALIF. L. REV. 1823 (2002). 
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conventional view argues that, unlike private parties in the contractual context, states do not 
pay damages for breaches of contract, but rather suffer reputational sanctions.23 The private 
contract analogy crumbles because of the absence of symmetry between the breaching party’s 
sanction and the non-breaching party’s loss.  
 
Despite this problem, scholars have focused extensively on monitoring mechanisms, 
sanctions, and sanction inflicting bodies. They have assumed that the dominant players are 
rational states who act to maximize contractual surplus.24 In structuring international 
agreements, states are most concerned about the impact that the agreement will have in 
changing state conduct. It is this concern about impact that will influence whether a state 
chooses hard or soft law. If states desire to have low impact, then they are more likely to 
choose soft law. Conversely, if they desire a high impact, then they will elect hard law. 
However, the correlation between impact and form of several international agreements is not 
positive.25 
 
The structuring of transnational commercial law agreements runs contrary to the 
assumptions of public international law scholars. To begin with, states are not the dominant 
actors in transnational commercial law. Even when states are significant actors, they worry 
less about compliance and monitoring than public international law scholars would admit. 
Indeed, most transnational commercial law conventions have no monitoring mechanisms 
whatsoever, and do not have unified dispute resolution mechanisms or tribunals. If states were 
interested in compliance, why would they desist from creating such mechanisms? The CISG’s 
drafters, for example, could have provided for the constitution of an international tribunal for 
the disposition of CISG cases. However, the drafters left the task of dispute resolution to 
domestic courts. Three current theories attempt to explain regime design: functionalism, 
liberalism, and realism.  
 
 
A. FUNCTIONALISM 
 
                                               
23
 See George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEG. 
STUD. 95 (2002). 
24
 Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 
YALE J. INT’L L. 335 (1989); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy 27 (1984).  
25
 Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705. 
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Scholars in the functionalist tradition have argued that drafters choose form based on 
desired results.26 Thus, drafters choose soft law because of its greater flexibility, 
conduciveness to incrementalism, non-state party participation, and lack of need for 
ratification.27 Some scholars assume that hard law impacts state behavior more than soft 
law.28 States prefer soft law when uncertainty is high, states’ interests diverge greatly, 
informational costs are low, and, consequently, reputational sanctions are low.29 Soft law also 
offers flexibility, which is valuable in areas where states are strongly wedded to their 
preferences. For example, Abbott and Snidal argue that states choose soft law as a “way 
station” to hard law; it is preferred when the subject challenges state sovereignty.30  
 
Functionalists argue that legalization is a means to increase the credibility of state 
commitments. States choose hard law when there are low domestic political costs, they desire 
to bind successive governments, and they need to modify the practices of their residents.31 
Legalization enhances credibility by limiting “self-serving auto-interpretation.”32 In the 
international system, the consequences of bad conduct within a particular convention or treaty 
regime can have negative consequences for the bad actor in other areas.33 “Auto-
interpretation” is limited by arbitral tribunals interpreting and applying hard-legal 
commitments, which is one reason to create or designate institutions that have the authority to 
bind the parties.34 Abbott and Snidal espouse a narrow role for tribunals: to apply and 
interpret hard law. This does not account for the ability of these tribunals to apply soft law. 
The tremendous success of soft law agreements like the UNIDROIT Principles and the 
Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) is attributable to their application by tribunals 
and courts. Abbott and Snidal hypothesize that hard law would result where “the benefits of 
cooperation are great but the potential for opportunism and its costs are high, where 
noncompliance is not easy to detect, where states want to form clubs of very committed states, 
and where executive agencies within a state want to commit other domestic actors such as the 
legislature to the international agreement.”35  
 
                                               
26
 Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 
(2000). 
27
 Id. 
28
 Andrew Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 EJIL 579 (2005). 
29
 Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 6, 591. 
30
 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 6, 423. 
31
 Id. 426. 
32
 Id. 427. 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 6, 429-430. 
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While functionalism has some explanatory power, it fails to explain fully why actors 
choose to structure a transnational commercial law agreement as either hard law or soft law. 
Consider, for example, the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, 1980. If Abbott and Snidal are right, the drafters should have chosen to embody their 
agreement in a convention rather than soft law because the benefits of cooperation are great 
but the potential for opportunism is high. A convention that provides a unified system of law 
for contracts for the sale of goods between parties in two different countries would provide 
cooperative benefits.36 Arguably, differences in national laws may cause “legal risk,”37 and 
stand in the way of cooperative interactions.38 Legal risk can encourage opportunism by 
contracting parties who may, for instance, race to litigate in a forum that will suit their 
interests in appropriate cases.39 Such opportunism can arouse fear and cause businesses to shy 
away from potentially profitable contracts, or to factor in additional costs to cover such 
risks.40 Assuming opportunism could be significant, eliminating or minimizing legal risk 
would play a salutary role in promoting contracts across national borders.41 In addition to 
legal risk, the differences in national laws impose transaction costs on contracting parties, 
ranging from the cost of obtaining legal opinions, fulfilling formal requirements, and 
translations, to the varying court costs of different legal systems. While large businesses 
might be able to absorb these costs, they can be prohibitive to small enterprises. 
 
Although the benefits of cooperation are clear, it is less clear if the risk of 
opportunistic conduct explains choice of structure when drafting the CISG.42 In theory, 
                                               
36
 This point is valid even after the adoption of the CISG. The joint response prepared by the Commission on 
European Contract Law (CECL), (hereinafter referred to as the “Joint Response”), Para 9. “it is difficult and 
often impractical for parties entering into agreements or already bound by contracts to obtain cost-effective 
information about foreign law relevant to rights and liabilities under transactions they are contemplating or have 
entered into. The problems are particularly acute in the area of the law of obligations and property law because 
even in many of the legal systems where this area of the law has been codified the legislation is relatively old 
and its meaning cannot be established without grasping the significance of much judicial interpretation of its 
provisions. In relative terms the law is less apparent and more difficult to ascertain with assurance of its 
correctness.” 
37
 The Joint Response stated that “[c]ontract laws across the EU show significant diversity on many fundamental 
points. Businesses cannot safely trade under the private law of another Member State in the supposition that it 
will be similarly to their own. The impossibility within reasonable conditions for participants in the internal 
market to acquire essential knowledge about foreign law always entails the danger of substantial loss of claims 
or unsuspected liabilities.” Joint Response of the Commission on European Contract Law and Study Group on 
European Civil Code’s response to the Communication on European Contract Law, 21.10.01 
38Paul Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International Commercial Law, 39 Va. J. Int'l 
L. 743, 746 (1999). 
39Id. 
40Id. 
41Id. 
42
 What kind of opportunistic conduct would the delegates worry about? Would it be that parties in some states 
would not be subject to the agreement? Would it be that courts in some states would not apply the agreement? 
Would it be that parties could act opportunistically and pick and choose the instrument or its component parts 
depending on their interests? These don’t appear to be prevented by the CISG. 
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opportunism could be prevented or, at the very least, minimized, by the drafters choosing 
convention over soft law. However, parties are just as free to exclude the law in whole or in 
part regardless of the fact that it is a convention.43 The principal benefit from choosing a 
convention is that courts in contracting states are bound to apply it unless the parties have 
excluded it by contract.44 However, most commercial parties exclude the CISG; thus, the 
binding nature is of limited utility. A study on the CISG conducted by Professor Michael 
Gordon in Florida showed that it was “largely unknown to crucial legal audiences in 
Florida.”45 A simple questionnaire study of the Maricopa County Bar association yielded 
similar results. The state of affairs documented by Gordon is not unique to Florida.46 It is an 
international phenomenon and may be because lawyers do not study the CISG in relevant 
courses.47 Many judges who responded seemed to think that the CISG only applied to federal 
courts.48 Several commodities business sectors routinely exclude the CISG’s application 
altogether.49 Even in cases where the CISG has been applied, it has come as a surprise to 
                                               
43
 Article 6 of the CISG provides that “[t]he parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to 
article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.” Available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf 
44
 This can be of dubious utility. See, Delchi v. Rotorex; MCC Marble v. Augostino; Zapata v. Hermanios. 
45
 Michael Gordon, Some Thoughts on the Receptiveness of Contract Rules in the CISG and UNIDROIT 
Principles as Reflected in One State’s (Florida) Experience of (1) Law School Faculty, (2) Members of the Bar 
with an International Practice, and (3) Judges, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 361 (1998). Prof. Gordon prepared a 
questionnaire and sent it to a random selection of 100 members of the Florida Bar Section on International Law 
and 100 judges, in addition to law professors in Florida. Most practitioners had no knowledge of the CISG, while 
approximately 30 percent had “reasonable knowledge” and only two a “fairly strong” knowledge. In contrast, 
only 15 percent had a “reasonable knowledge” of the UNIDROIT Principles while one had “fairly strong” 
knowledge. Id. 368. See also Arthur Rosett, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: 
A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 357 (1998). 
46
 Id. 348. 
47
 According to Gordon, “[m]ost responses disclosed the adoption of casebooks which made no reference to 
either the CISG or the UNIDROIT Principles. In no cases did faculty indicate they included CISG or the 
UNIDROIT Principles where they were not included in their casebook. No response indicated any reference to 
the UNIDROIT Principles in adopted casebooks. Even when the CISG was included in the casebook, it was not 
always assigned for class.” 
48
 Id. This is clearly wrong. As held by the court in BP Oil International, Ltd., and BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., v. 
Empresa Estatal Petroleos De Ecuador (Petroecuador), et al., 332 F.3d 333 (2003): “A signatory’s assent to the 
CISG necessarily incorporates the treaty as part of that nation’s domestic law. Where parties seek to apply a 
signatory’s domestic law in lieu of the CISG, they must affirmatively opt-out of the CISG. In Asante Techs., Inc. 
v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2001), the court held that a choice-of-law provision 
selecting British Columbia law did not, without more, “evince a clear intent to opt out of the CISG . . . . 
Defendant’s choice of applicable law adopts the law of British Columbia, and it is undisputed that the CISG is 
the law of British Columbia” (internal citations omitted). Similarly in Usinor Indusreel v. Leeco Steel Products 
Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 880, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2002), “when the CISG applies, it pre-empts domestic sales law that 
otherwise would govern the contract, such as Article 2 of the UCC.” Id. The court held that “at the time of 
contracting, the parties have the opportunity to opt-out, and decide that the UCC, or other domestic law, 
applies.” Id. 
49
 Jan Smits, Law Making In The European Union: On Globalization And Contract Law In Divergent Legal 
Cultures, 67 La. L. Rev. 1181, 1187 (2007) (…many general conditions set by … Federation of Oils, Seeds, and 
Fats (“FOSFA”) and the Grain and Feed Trade Association (“GAFTA”)[exclude the CISG]. A survey among 
some large Dutch companies showed that most of them exclude the applicability of the CISG ... Smaller Dutch 
companies often do not exclude the CISG, unless legal advice was sought by one of the companies involved.”); 
GAFTA contract 100, clause 33 is an example: “International Conventions[:] The following shall not apply to 
this contract:--(a) the Uniform Law on Sales and the Uniform Law on Formation to which effect is given by the 
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parties.50 Lawyers either do not know of the application of the convention or choose to apply 
domestic law instead. This suggests that learning externalities are a key contributor to the lack 
of impact. Unless lawyers become comfortable with applying the convention and move away 
from an impulsive exclusion of its operation, the CISG will never play a significant role.51 
Adopting it as a convention did little to reduce opportunistic conduct based on this evidence. 
 
Abbott and Snidal also claim that some international law commitments can be 
enforced by domestic law, primarily as customary international law. However, it is unclear if 
they limit their arguments to hard law. The examples provided, the torture convention and the 
Whaling convention, suggest that they are only contemplating hard law.52 It is not clear that 
the restriction to hard law is fully accurate: courts have frequently referred to soft law 
instruments like the UNIDROIT Principles as evidence of custom and accordingly applied 
them when deciding cases. 
 
Functionalists argue that soft law is advantageous because of lower contracting costs: 
less expenditure in terms of drafting time, negotiation, ratification, etc.53 Abbott and Snidal 
argue that hard law is more costly because states are more careful in “negotiating and drafting 
                                                                                                                                                   
Uniform Laws on International Sales Act 1967; (b) the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods of 1980; and (c) the United Nations Convention on Prescription (Limitation) in the 
International Sale of Goods of 1974 and the amending Protocol of 1980.” See, Michael Bridge, The International 
Sale of Goods: Law and Practice, appendix (1999). 
50
 Volker Behr, The Sales Convention in Europe: From Problems in Drafting to Problems in Practice, 17 J. L.& 
COM. 263–99 (1998). 
51
 As one scholar notes in the U.S. context, “The difficulties and potential additional expense created by the fact 
that foreign cases construing the CISG are relevant, even critical, to a proper interpretation of the Convention is 
undoubtedly one reason that U.S. practitioners continue to advise clients engaged in international sales 
transaction to avoid the application of the CISG in favor of U.S. domestic sales law.” See, Harry M. Flechtner, 
Recovering Attorneys’ Fees as Damages under the U.N. Sales Convention (CISG): The Role Of Case Law in the 
New International Commercial Practice, With Comments on Zapata Hermanos v. Hearthside Baking, 22 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 121, 133-34 (2002); One author wrote that despite several years of CISG practice, it is “still 
regarded by U.S. courts as somewhat of an interloper. Most U.S. judges since its 1988 ratification have either 
applied the Convention superficially or ignored it outright. Though some courts have engaged in valiant efforts 
to interpret the Convention autonomously, most have been coy with its pesky mandates, merely flirting with 
generally accepted methods of CISG interpretation only to make ultimate decisions through the lens of domestic 
law.” Jeffrey R. Hartwig, Schmitz-Werke GmbH & Co. v. Rockland Industries Inc. and the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG): Diffidence and Developing International 
Legal Norms, 22 J.L. & COM. 77 (2003) (internal citations omitted); Mathias Reimann, The CISG in the United 
States: Why It Has Been Neglected and Why Europeans Should Care, 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/reimann.html ( “A closer look at the U.S. data reveals that the number of 
truly relevant cases is even lower than 87. Whoever reads the reported decisions will quickly notice that in 
approximately half of them, CISG is neither applied nor interpreted. … the number of cases reported in the 
United States is merely an indication of the Convention's small practical relevance.” ); One practitioner writes 
that the “slow acceptance” by lawyers in the U.S. should not be mistaken for rejection. See, Susanne Cook, CISG 
from the Perspective of the Practitioner, 17 J.L. & COM. 343, 349–52 (1998).  
52
 Principle of pacta sunt servanda, a concept based on contracts.  
53
 By which is meant the expenditure in terms of drafting time, negotiation, ratification 
Demandeur-centric theory: Draft  10 
legal agreements, since the costs of violation are higher.”54 The argument with regard to hard 
law being more costly than soft law is only true on one front: ratification. All the other costs 
are incurred in the case of soft law too. Experts will still have to be consulted. Differences 
between legal families and systems must still be resolved. Negotiation is still contentious as 
proponents of various interests argue just as vigorously.55 Drafting soft transnational 
commercial law agreements takes just as long as conventions. The UNIDROIT Principles 
have been a work in progress for over 20 years.56 In contrast, the Hague Convention on 
Certain Rights with respect to Securities held with Intermediaries took about two years from 
start to finish.57  
 
Abbott and Snidal’s examples distinguishing hard and soft law focus on ratification 
costs. However, soft law instruments cannot be created and placed on library shelves for free; 
effective dissemination requires marketing to the relevant constituencies. Notwithstanding 
these criticisms, it is true that agencies creating transnational commercial law exhibit 
weariness regarding the cost of ratification. A perception exists that the labor expended in 
creating the instrument is largely wasted if the instrument does not achieve the minimum 
number of ratifications necessary for the convention to enter into force.  
 
An illustration of this trend is work of the Interamerican Conference on Private 
International Law (CIDIP), an organ of the OAS.58 CIDIP instruments have been bedeviled 
by the vexing problem of low ratifications despite the expenditure of considerable time and 
resources.59 The organization undertook a study to address this issue and made changes to its 
working methods, recognizing the opportunities presented by non-convention instruments. 60 
                                               
54
 Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note 6, 434. They write that “Legal specialists must be consulted; 
bureaucratic reviews are often lengthy. Different legal traditions across states complicate the exercise. Approval 
and ratification processes, typically involving legislative authorization, are more complex than for purely 
political agreements.” 
55
 If it were otherwise, it might suggest that the parties do not intend that the instrument be of much use! 
56
 www.unidroit.org 
57
 Sandeep Gopalan, New Trends in the Making of International Commercial Law, J. L. & COM. 117 (2004). 
See also, Conclusions of the Special Commission held from 1–3 April 2003 on General Affairs and Policy of the 
Conference, available at <http://www.hcch.net/ doc/genaff_concl2003.pdf>, noting that “[t]he Commission 
welcomed the flexibility and innovative character of the working methods used for this project and the speed at 
which the project has been completed without a vote being cast.” 
58
 There have been six CIDIP conferences. The first was held in Panama in 1975. See Carlos Vazquez, 
Regionalism Versus Globalism: A View from the Americas, UNIFORM. L. REV. 2003-1/2, 62. CIDIP has 
crafted conventions on bills of exchange and checks, commercial arbitration, letters rogatory, foreign evidence, 
the legal regime governing powers of attorney, and model laws on secured transactions, and negotiable 
instruments. 
59
 See an introduction to CIDIP-VII authored by Carlos Vazquez and Joao Rodas at 
<http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=. ./. ./documents/ eng/oasinbrief.asp> 
60
 See introduction to CIDIP-VII authored by Carlos Vazquez and Joao Rodas at 
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=. ./. ./ documents/eng/oasinbrief.asp (“The problem of 
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This example supports the ILO case that Abbott and Snidal provide.61 However, neither case 
proves that hard law costs more than soft law. At best, they support the view that the 
declining number of ratifications is deterring international agencies. However, this decline in 
ratifications may be attributed to any number of reasons: the instrument is inadequate in 
comparison to domestic law,62 legislatures do not care about the subject matter, international 
law is not needed, the state hardly participated in the drafting process,63 the perception that the 
instrument panders to powerful interest groups,64 and pressure from conflicting interest 
groups.65 These alternative explanations call into question Abbott & Snidal’s claim that 
“softer forms of legalization will be more attractive to states as contracting costs increase.”66 
Rather than the increased cost, in many instances, what seems to be motivating the choice 
against hard law is the realization that the cost of ratification is only worthwhile in some 
instances because of the dispositive nature of conventions. Ratification may not add much by 
way of bindingness or, more importantly, impact. Thus, it is unclear if the trade-offs between 
contracting costs and the choice between hard law and soft law occurs, except for the 
aforementioned point about ratification costs. 
 
Raustiala argues that the risk of opportunistic conduct “suggests that pledges will be 
observed only when the risk of opportunism is low and uncertainty is high.”67 However, he 
does concede that “the choice to negotiate a pledge” is not the “product of a preference for 
flexibility on the part of negotiators.”68 However, opportunism lacks traction in the context of 
dispositive law. Opportunism has explanatory power when one is talking about public goods. 
However, private law arguably does not engender opportunistic conduct in the same way. 
Commercial parties likely do not value their legal systems beyond a bare minimum, and 
would be satisfied by any substitute sophisticated and predictable legal system.  
                                                                                                                                                   
decreasing ratifications may well already have been addressed through a change implemented in CIDIP VI. In 
contrast to previous CIDIPs, which have elaborated draft conventions on traditional subjects of private 
intentional law, such as jurisdiction, choice of law, and enforcement of judgments, CIDIP VI has focused on 
producing model laws on substantive topics of private (commercial) law. CIDIP VI will consider for adoption a 
model law on secured financing as well as a model law on draft bill of lading for the carriage of goods by road. 
Some respondents praised this recent focus on model laws, while other respondents lamented it.”) 
61
 Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note…434. 
62
 This explains the lack of ratification of the ULIS and ULIF conventions drafted by UNIDRIOIT. 
63
 This explains the United States refusal to ratify ULIS and ULIF. 
64
 This explains the reluctance of developing countries to ratify the Hague-Visby Rules. 
65
 This explains the United States’ refusal to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The 
last reason is the least powerful in the transnational commercial law context. None of these reasons pertain to 
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 Id. 436. 
67
 Raustiala, supra note 6, 593. “…the risk of opportunism may be central to the choice between legal and 
nonlegal agreement.” Id. 594. 
68
 Id. 
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 Raustiala writes that in “more technocractic and arcane areas, the available empirical 
evidence suggests that the prevalence of pledges roughly, if inconsistently, rises as 
uncertainty rises – as functional theory predicts.”69 He provides examples to support both the 
functionalist claim that uncertainty influences the form of international agreement and the 
liberal claim that pledges are “most common in areas of low domestic salience.”70 However, 
one example in the technocratic area directly contradicts this claim: the Hague Convention on 
the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary 
(“Hague Convention”).71  The Hague Convention creates a hard law agreement in the face of 
enormous uncertainty that was said to threaten the very survival of the global financial 
system.72 The genesis of the Hague Convention was a joint proposal by Australia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States suggesting that a “short multilateral Convention clarifying 
applicable law rules for securities held through intermediaries” as “a basis for the world-wide 
adoption of consistent principles” was necessary because of the inadequacy of the present 
legal regime.73 The proposal was based on the prevalence of transactions involving 
intermediaries between the issuer and the holder of securities, wherein the latter’s interest is 
only recorded by the intermediary on its books.74 
 
 
 Although the demandeurs appeared to be states, in reality, private actors drove the 
process.75 The Hague Conference commissioned a feasibility study by Christophe Bernasconi 
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70
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 Available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=72. 
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 http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=72 
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 Conclusions of the Special Commission of May 2000 on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference, 
Preliminary Document No. 10 of June 2000 for the attention of the Nineteenth Session, 25–26, available at 
<http://www.hcch.net/e/ workprog/genaff.html>. 
74
 See Proposal by the delegations of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Working Document 
No. 1 E, May 2000 available at <http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/genaff.html>. The proposal argued that “The 
need for a Convention is urgent because of the systemic risk implications and because the existing legal 
uncertainty in the area has the potential to impede the growth internationally of financial services industry 
arrangements for the transfer of securities through multiple tiers of intermediaries.” Exposure is very high: 
European securitisation issuance alone was Eur. 157.8 billion for 2002 according to the European Securitisation 
Forum. See <http://www.europeansecuritisation.com pubs/ESF2002ReportRelease.pdf>; See also, Klaus Lober, 
“The Harmonisation of the Legal Framework for Rights Evidenced by Book Entries—A Report by the European 
Financial Markets Lawyers’ Group,” J.I.B.L.R. 2003, 18 (10), 413; Philippe Dupont, Regulatory Aspects of the 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary, 
4, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/dupont.pdf (“At present, it is very 
common to find a scenario where a collateral provider in country A provides to a bank, as collateral taker, in 
country B a pledge over securities issued by issuers of three different nationalities and booked to one account 
with a central securities depositary (CSD) in country C and held physically in the vaults of a local depositary or 
by nominee registration for this CSD in different countries.”) 
75
 See Proposal, available at <http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/genaff.html>.(The ICSA “committed its members 
to urging their governments to support the consideration of an international Convention on this topic by the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law at its meeting on general affairs and policy in May 2000.”) 
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of its Permanent Bureau prior to embarking on the project. The study found that the 
traditional direct holding system, which was characterized by a direct relationship between the 
issuer of the securities and the owner, was an anachronism in most modern legal systems.76 
The modern system consisted of tiered relationships between the securities issuer and owner. 
These tiers consisted of various intermediaries, who made entries on their books in respect of 
interests relating to themselves.77 Thus, the law in most countries needed modification to 
address the range of problems associated with indirect holding systems.78  
 
 Another feature of the system is fungibility and commingling: the owner’s securities were 
not uniquely identified, thus, owners frequently were only entitled to securities of equal value. 
This created problems for the property law concept of lex situs, which resolved conflicts of 
law,79 because commingling effectively eliminates the owner’s direct proprietary interest.80 
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 Christophe Bernasconi, The Law Applicable to Dispositions of Securities Held through Indirect Holding 
Systems, Preliminary Document No. 1 of November 2000, available at 
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Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary, 1, available at 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/dupont.pdf>. 
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 Such intermediaries may operate on several levels. As Potok points out, an example may be of an Australian 
Investor who holds securities of Illinois Corp, which are recorded by its intermediary, French Bank, which holds 
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Sub-custodian. The last named also holds interests in respect of Illinois Corp., for the European ICSD and its 
other customers with the DTC. See Richard Potok, CROSS BORDER COLLATERAL: LEGAL RISK AND 
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (London: 2002). 
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 In the fact situation outlined in n.97, if the Investor in Australia decides to pledge its security interests in 
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 The Bernasconi Report, 19. Under traditional rules common to both the common law and civil law, depositors 
retain property rights in respect of property held by a depository so long as it has not been commingled. In the 
event that the property is commingled, the depositor may have a contractual claim for the same amount and type 
of property, or may have a common, co-ownership interest in the commingled pool along with other depositors. 
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Legal systems have adopted a variety of approaches to solve the resulting difficulties.81 Some 
systems only recognized a contractual right when there was commingling; others conferred a 
co-proprietary right to the owner. These differences created serious uncertainties with regard 
to the applicable law.82 The traditional approach was the look through approach: the law 
assumed that the intermediaries were transparent and looked through them to the ultimate 
issuer or registrar. The feasibility study found that this approach created “severe practical 
difficulties:”83 serious transaction costs and systemic risk due to legal uncertainties.84 The 
study concluded that the Hague Conference should create a uniform standard to determine the 
law applicable to proprietary aspects of intermediary transactions.85 Most scholars assumed 
that the convention would embody the Place of the Relevant Intermediary Approach 
(PRIMA).86 However, it became apparent quickly that the problem necessitated a new 
approach based on the reality that a record would only be maintained by the intermediary with 
whom the owner has a direct relationship. Thus, the solution was to look to the account 
agreement. 
 
 The conclusions of the feasibility study were buttressed by the views of experts and 
market participants.87 The nature of the problem meant that national solutions would be 
inadequate. One expert noted: “only a multi-national law reform will help cure the problem as 
local initiatives would always be subject to the risk of being challenged abroad.”88 The 
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 These range from the antiquated no-commingling approach of some German intermediaries which hold 
certificates held together by a ribbon stating the name of the actual owner, to co-proprietary rights which may 
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82
 The Bernasconi Report, 27–29. See Philippe Dupont, Regulatory Aspects of the Hague Convention on the Law 
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Demandeur-centric theory: Draft  15 
Securities Industry Association (SIA), a key market participant, also supported an 
international solution.89 Some experts even suggested that the present situation “put[s] at risk 
the capital base of banks as well as payment systems and the central banks that run these 
systems.”90  
 
 The Hague Conference drafted a convention in a remarkably short time: two years. The 
convention looks to the account agreement to determine the applicable law. It contains several 
default rules where the account agreement does not determine the applicable law. It has been 
signed by the United States and Switzerland, and is awaiting ratification by major players like 
the European Union.91 
 
 This example calls into question both the functional and liberal claims that soft law 
preference is tied to uncertainty and low domestic salience. It also casts doubt upon 
Raustiala’s claim that legality and depth have a negative correlation.92 More specifically, 
Raustialia argues that pledges are deeper than contracts because they do not raise compliance 
worries. Hence states prefer pledges if they want to make deep commitments rather than 
shallow ones. Conversely, states will prefer hard law when they are making shallow 
commitments. Thus, hard law is likely to exhibit higher levels of compliance. However, even 
assuming that ratification is a proxy for compliance, empirical evidence reveals low levels of 
ratification for conventions. Accordingly, other factors affect ratification beyond the depth of 
commitments. Based on the empirical evidence, one could even argue that compliance has 
little or no meaning in the transnational commercial law context because of its dispositive 
nature. 
 
 Raustiala then advances a seemingly contradictory functionalist argument: legality 
correlates positively with depth. Thus, states embody their agreements in hard law when they 
are making deep commitments.93 Both explanations can be understood by addressing the risk 
of compliance: a negative correlation exists when a state may not want to comply, and a 
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Demandeur-centric theory: Draft  16 
positive correlation exists when a state wants other states to comply.94 Also, the correlation 
between legality and depth will be positive when powerful domestic constituencies push for 
the agreement and will be negative when the domestic constituencies demanding agreement 
lack political power.95  
 
 Despite their explanatory power in public law, these correlations do not translate to 
transnational commercial law. The ICC and its constituents possess significant political power 
but still chose to draft the UCP 600 and the Incoterms as non-convention law. Conversely, the 
aircraft manufacturing and leasing industries also possess enormous political clout, and, 
unlike the ICC, chose to structure their agreement as a convention.96 One could reasonably 
conclude that political clout can be employed to choose both hard law and soft law, thus 
diluting its explanatory power. For example, consider a segment of the economy that does not 
have much political power: small businesses that enter into international contracts on a daily 
basis. If Raustiala is right, the CISG should have been designed as soft law rather than a 
convention.  The same is the case with the UNIDROIT Conventions on International 
Financial Leasing, and International Factoring.97 However, contrary to the correlation thesis, 
both international commercial agreements took the form of hard law. 
 
B. LIBERAL THEORIES 
 
 Liberal theorists, such as Moravcsik, place non-state actors at the center of 
international politics.98 They argue that non-state actors influence both the behavior and 
preferences of governments.99 These non-state actors, whom Moravcsik calls societal actors, 
“are on the average rational and risk-averse and … organize exchange and collective action to 
promote differentiated interests under constraints.”100 Liberal theory is premised on a bottom-
up approach: the preferences of non-state actors “are treated as exogenous causes of the 
interests underlying state behavior.”101 One interest group or another captures a state, which 
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then expresses those preferences in international politics.102 Thus, non-state actors prefer 
contracts to pledges,103 as exemplified by the land mines convention, TRIPS, and agreements 
on environmental protection.104  
 
 However, this preference for hard law can also be explained by the fact that these 
subject areas are not dispositive. These agreements have aspects of the mandatory laws of 
nation states because non-state actors had little choice other than conventions if they aimed to 
design a successful agreement. Accordingly, the choice of hard law is determined by the 
extent to which the subject matter is amenable to self regulation. If state assistance is needed 
for regulation, hard law will result and vice versa. Nevertheless, in the transnational 
commercial law area, the perception of compliance does not motivate non-state actors to 
choose hard law. This is because non-state actors are likely to be highly integrated and thus 
possess sanctioning mechanisms that stem from membership. For example, the International 
Chamber of Commerce, which has crafted international agreements in several areas, has 
favored non-convention law, as in the UCP 600 where banks and financial institutions being 
members facilitated enforcement without state involvement.105 
 
 Some have argued that domestic political pressures play a role in the choice between 
pledges and contracts.106 This is certainly true in hotly-contested areas. However, political 
pressure is unlikely to be a factor in transnational commercial law. By definition, international 
agreements are restricted to commercial transactions and almost invariably exclude consumer 
transactions, 107  thus insulating transnational commercial law from political pressures. The 
insulation is so powerful that political apathy is more visible than political interest. This is 
partly to blame for the low rate of ratification of transnational commercial law conventions: 
they are almost never interesting enough for politicians to prioritize.108 Therefore, the desire 
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to insulate governments from domestic political pressure is unlikely to motivate the choice of 
soft law versus convention law under the theory that the former is less likely to be brought up 
for legislative scrutiny. 
 
 Liberal theorists also argue that actors consider credibility when choosing between soft 
law and hard law. When credibility depends on legislative approval, states prefer hard law 
unless the state possesses other mechanisms to ensure and enhance credibility.109 However, 
state credibility is largely irrelevant in the transnational commercial law area: it is the 
credibility of the parties who enter into contracts that is the relevant consideration. This is 
unaffected by the law’s character being hard or soft. 
 
C. REALISM 
 
 Realists argue that the powerful states’s preferences dominate the choice between soft 
law and hard law.110 The principal players, states, seek power in a zero sum world.111 
International law is merely an instrument in the hands of powerful states. States choose hard 
law when they wish to convey the “seriousness” of their “intent to be bound.”112 States will 
also choose hard law when the other state “demands a strong or lasting commitment,” when 
there is domestic legislative support, and when there is no urgency.113 Given that realism is 
predicated on states being the primary players, transnational commercial law’s emphasis on 
non-state actors poses serious problems. If realists are correct, powerful states should have 
little incentive in entering into transnational commercial law agreements because the 
advantage that they enjoy in the absence of such agreements would be lost. This advantage is 
primarily from contracting parties choosing the laws of powerful states to govern their 
contracts, and to subject dispute to resolution before their courts. Such advantages are enjoyed 
by the U.S., U.K., and France, and yet these states are frequently at the forefront of drafting 
transnational commercial law agreements. The U.S. should not have ratified the CISG as early 
as 1986 because it differs significantly from article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
Under the realist view, dominant states should only pursue transnational commercial law 
agreements to the extent that they can export their own laws to the rest of the world. Given the 
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balance of power, such agreements should in most cases be heavily based on the domestic 
laws of dominant states. Yet, it is invariably the case that these agreements are the results of 
compromises between the laws of many states. This has not been cited as a reason for states to 
refuse to ratify the instrument. Realists might point to one example -   the U.K.’s reluctance to 
ratify the CISG is because of its self interest in preserving the dominance of English law. This 
is facilitated by the fact that the demandeurs of the CISG are weak and diffused, undermining 
the ability to draw conclusions that might support the realist view. Realism has some traction 
if the focus is shifted to the relative power of demandeurs who are more important than states 
in designing transnational commercial law agreements. This might explain why the Cape 
Town convention was structured as hard law with many mandatory provisions. The 
demandeurs in that case – Boeing and Airbus were powerful actors and their preferences are 
reflected in the convention’s form, substance, and structure. A hybrid approach that combines 
the insights from realism with the focus on the role of non-state actors from liberal theory 
would offer explanatory power. This approach can be labeled demandeur-centric. 
 
II. A DEMANDEUR–CENTRIC APPROACH 
 
 An alternative approach to the structuring of international agreements is to look at 
design and structure from the perspective of those commercial parties demanding agreements. 
Thus, demandeurs, rather than states, play the central role in the design and structure of 
international commercial agreements. According to Abbott and Snidal,  
demandeurs should seek hard legalization (1) when the likelihood of 
opportunism and its costs are high, and noncompliance is difficult to detect; (2) 
when they wish to limit participation to those strongly committed to an 
agreement; and (3) when executive officials in other states have preferences 
compatible with those of the demandeurs, but other elites within those states 
have divergent preferences.114  
However, functionalist claims do not explain completely the instruments already considered. 
Opportunism and compliance play a very limited role in transnational commercial law due to 
its dispositive nature. Functionalists claim that hard law will be preferred when participation 
is limited to those seeking strong commitments. However, that is rebutted by the existence of 
the ICC’s UCP 600 and the Incoterms. The modified-functionalist claim that soft law will 
result when demandeurs confront stinted opposition is rebutted by the existence of soft law in 
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 Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law, supra note 6, 431. 
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cases where there is no opposition, such as the UNIDROIT Principles, and by the existence of 
hard law despite opposition, like the Hamburg Convention on Carriage of Goods by Sea.115 
 
 How, then, does the demandeur-centric approach offer greater explanatory power? 
Demandeurs will be primarily motivated by the extent to which a transnational agreement 
necessitates state involvement. Accordingly, there is no tradeoff between form and depth in 
this calculation. Deep agreements can result if the demandeurs believe that state involvement 
can be minimal or nonexistent, and equally if they decide that state involvement is essential. 
Depth is thus not tied to determinations as to form, but rather connected to the degree of 
demandeur integration. The more diffuse the demandeurs, the shallower the agreement, 
regardless of whether the agreement is a convention or a non-convention.  
 
 Conversely, if demandeurs are tightly integrated and capable of self-policing, then 
they exhibit a preference for non-convention law because of minimal reliance on state 
intervention. The demandeurs in this scenario are confident in their ability to get the 
agreement to work without state support. Integration confers on demandeurs state-like police 
powers and they serve as enforcers outside the state system. In this case, the choice of 
convention law would be inimical to their interests because of the need to co-opt state actors 
who may lack technical expertise. It may also signal a low level of integration.   
 
 One could argue that, even rejecting the depth-hard law correlation, bindingness is still 
a variable in agreement design. However, the UNIDROIT Principles and the UCP 600 
contradict Raustiala’s claim that “there is a dearth of state practice in support of the idea that 
formally nonlegal agreements are actually quasi-legal.”116 Courts and arbitral tribunals in 
several countries have referred to the UNIDROIT Principles in deciding cases, which is 
puzzling because several of the disputed contracts do not refer to the UNIDROIT Principles. 
This suggests that, although the Principles do not bind states, in practice they perform the 
function of binding law. Conversely, so-called binding laws, such as the CISG, are not so 
binding because of provisions which allow parties to exclude the convention in whole or in 
part.117 Deference to the law that the parties have created, i.e., the contract, is almost universal 
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 This UN convention was adopted despite opposition from the major shipping nations and industry groups 
because of the alleged bias in the previous regime in favor of shipping interests. See, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3343,fr_2649_34337_1866253_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
116
 Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 6, 590. 
117
 CISG article 6: “The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate 
from or vary the effect of any of its provisions”; Article 6 of the UN Convention on the Assignment of 
Receivables in International Trade: “Subject to article 19, the assignor, the assignee and the debtor may derogate 
from or vary by agreement provisions of this Convention relating to their respective rights and obligations. Such 
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in transnational commercial law, and severely undermines the claim that demandeurs desire 
binding law. The deference also does not support a distinction between hard law, like a 
contract, and soft law, like a pledge: the UNIDROIT Principles are not a pledge in any sense 
of the word. The hard law versus soft law distinction means little in the transnational 
commercial law setting: soft law often includes a sense of obligation derived either from 
membership in the organization that promulgated the law or incorporation of the law into a 
contract. It is not soft in any meaningful sense of the term because it contains obligations just 
as deep as those embodied in state law.118 
 
A. CHOICE OF FORM DEPENDS ON DEMANDEURS 
 
 Demandeurs choose form and structure based on relative power. An example is the 
drafting history of the Cape Town Convention.119 At the outset, UNIDROIT distributed a 
questionnaire to business and financial circles with the goal of empirically establishing the 
need for an agreement.120 About one thousand copies of the questionnaire and an explanatory 
report were sent to banks, financial institutions, confederations of industry, major industrial 
bodies, and airlines. The response rate was very low: only ninety-three entities replied. The 
respondents were primarily from the lending side: fifty-two lenders, eight sellers, ten buyers, 
one foreign trade corporation, two governmental agencies, ten law teachers, and twelve 
practicing lawyers.121 Despite the law response rate, UNIDROIT was satisfied that there was 
sufficient support and determined that a convention was appropriate. The aircraft industry was 
involved from the early drafting stages and slowly became the engine of progress. Airbus 
                                                                                                                                                   
an agreement does not affect the rights of any person who is not a party to the agreement.” Available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/receivables/ctc-assignment-convention-e.pdf. 
118
 I make no claims about the functionalist claim that soft law, characterized as non-state law in my scheme, is a 
way station to hard law. It could serve as a way station because integration collapses or because demandeurs 
realize that state sanctions are needed to recognize private agreements. I provide several examples of state and 
non-state law in the following pages to test the demandeur-centric hypothesis. 
119 See Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (adopted on Nov. 16, 2001) (noting that 
sixty-four nations attended the diplomatic conference in Cape Town, South Africa and fifty-three nations signed 
the final act); see also Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters 
Specific to Aircraft Equipment, at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-main.htm. The Convention and 
its Protocol have been ratified by nineteen nations to date. Id. 
120 See UNIDROIT, International Regulation of Aspects of Security Interests in Mobile Equipment: 
Questionnaire, Study LXXII-Doc. 2 (1989) (noting the need to test five assumptions before proceeding with the 
preparation of the convention). The assumptions are that (1) valuable mobile equipment is moved across national 
frontiers; (2) the laws of most nations that deal with security interests are inadequate, (3) the UNIDROIT 
Convention can address the inadequacies, (4) international experts in the field support the initiatives of the 
UNIDROIT Convention, and (5) that financing organizations will be more willing to provide financing for high 
cost mobile equipment if there were accepted international standards regarding the matter. See id. 
121 See UNIDROIT, Analysis of the Replies to the Questionnaire on an International Regulation of Aspects of 
Security Interests in Mobile Equipment, Study LXXII-Doc. 3 (1991) (concluding that “the types of legal 
problems arising in the context of the international recognition of security interests in mobile equipment could be 
adequately addressed through an international convention containing a mix of choice of law and substantive 
rules the implementation of which would not require sweeping changes in the municipal law of most States”). 
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Industry and Boeing, the forces behind the aviation working group, wanted an asset-based 
financing regime.122  
 
 Not every participant agreed with the aircraft lobby. Some nations claimed that 
commercially oriented remedies would offend national sovereignty. For example, the 
Government of Japan in 1999, stated that “imposing under [A]rticle X (1) a 30 day deadline 
(or any deadline) for obtaining judicial relief would be inconsistent with concepts of civil 
procedure in Japan and, therefore, unacceptable.”123 Rather than getting bogged down in 
ideological debates, the aircraft working group worked around such objections by drafting 
opt-in rules that states could accept based on their comfort level with asset-based financing 
principles.124 Also, in order to quash sovereignty concerns, the aircraft group commissioned 
an economic impact assessment to demonstrate the need for a convention and the potential 
benefits of ratification.125 The EIA concluded that greater reliance on asset-backed aircraft 
finance instruments would divert financing that would otherwise require sovereign bank 
credits or sovereign international bond issues into the private sector.126 Thus, the proposed 
convention would improve access of developing and emerging country airlines to secured 
loans and leases on a commercial basis. Following the adoption of the convention, the Export 
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 For example, one such memorandum stated “To be materially beneficial, the basic (non-exclusive) remedies 
under the proposed convention of possession/repossession/seizure, judicially supervised sale and judicial sale set 
forth in the summary report need to be available within an expedited time frame, and notwithstanding any 
contrary provisions of national law. We recommend, therefore, that the proposed convention provide a 
mandatory timetable in which courts having jurisdiction under the proposed convention would be required to 
determine issues brought before them relating to these basic remedies. In particular, we recommend that such 
courts be required to issue non-appealable, final decisions in respect of the availability of (a) the grounding of 
the aircraft (pending further litigation procedures) no later than five days, and (b) the right of the financier/lessor 
to repossession/seizure, or to a judicially supervised sale/judicial sale, of the aircraft no later than thirty days, in 
each case of the date on which the application is made to the court with in rem jurisdiction over the aircraft.” See 
UNIDROIT, Study Group for the Preparation of Uniform Rules on International Interests in Mobile Equipment: 
Subcommittee for the Preparation of First Draft, Study LXXII-Doc. 16 (1995) 16-17 (suggesting changes and 
additions to the remedies section of the Convention). The Airbus Industry and Boeing Company continue that 
‘for commercial reasons, these remedies must be non-exclusive‘ in that ‘additional remedies available under the 
selected law... or under the private international law rules of the forum...must also be available to the transaction 
parties.‘ Id. at 16. 
123 UNIDROIT, Committee of Governmental Experts for the Preparation of a Draft Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment and a Draft Protocol on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, Study LX11- 
Doc.49 / (1999) 3. 
124 The AWG wrote that “[o]ur highest priority in participating in the proposed convention is to ensure that 
contracting states have the option of selecting rules which embody this fundamental principle, thereby permitting 
transaction parties in their countries to take greater advantage of international asset-based financing in 
connection with the acquisition of unprecedented amounts of required aircraft equipment . . . . This fundamental 
principle is but abstract rhetoric if the actual timing element is undefined and potentially open-ended. In direct 
terms, if this timing element is not addressed, both inside and outside the insolvency contexts, the proposed 
convention will have a marginal impact on credit, leasing and lending decisions and will thus be of marginal 
benefit to the air transport industry.” See UNIDROIT, Study Group for the Preparation of Uniform Rules on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Study LXII- Doc. 32, Add. 2, 3 (1996). 
125 Anthony Saunders & Ingo Walters, Proposed UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment as Applicable to Aircraft Equipment Through the Aircraft Equipment Protocol: Economic Impact 
Assessment, reprinted in 23 Air & Space L. 339 (1998) (hereinafter EIA). 
126 EIA, at xiii. 
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Import Bank of the United States reduced its exposure fee on financing of U.S. commercial 
aircraft by one-third for foreign buyers from countries that have ratified and implemented the 
Cape Town Convention.127 
 
 Demandeurs, with their dominant position in the market and enormous economic 
clout, used their leverage to convince states to ratify the convention. Demandeur clout also 
explains the relatively large number of mandatory provisions128 in contrast to the CISG. The 
drafting of controversial provisions as opt-in or opt-out clauses also allowed the industry to 
bargain more strategically. But for the demanduers’ economic clout, the convention likely 
would not have included many of these provisions. Even if they had been included, they 
would have been watered down versions. Because Airbus and Boeing, the two dominant 
aircraft companies, worked together, the agreement effectuated their preferences. Airbus and 
Boeing desired a binding convention that created an “international interest,” provided 
expeditious recourse to the asset in case of default, established an international registry, and 
made available self help remedies. These could only be achieved with state involvement, and, 
because their market power secured state approval, they chose to embody the agreement in 
convention form. 
 
 The Cape Town convention calls into question Raustiala’s depth-legality 
correlation.129 One could conclude that the political privilege of the international demandeurs 
is more important that those of the domestic demandeurs. In the Cape Town convention, the 
largest number of domestic demandeurs should have been from developing countries, a group 
that consists of more borrowers than lenders. One would assume that actors from developing 
countries would prefer less depth: as borrowers, they run the risk of default and could take 
advantage of delays provided by the domestic legal system. However, their interests yielded 
to the more powerful international demandeurs. Lenders and aircraft manufacturers carried 
the day and did not want to take any chances with the borrowers’ legal systems. 
 
B. DEMANDEURS CHOOSE NON-LEGAL AGREEMENTS WHEN THEY DO NOT 
NEED STATE INVOLVEMENT 
 
                                               
127 Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the United States, Ex-Im Bank Offers One-Third Reduction of 
Exposure Fee on Export Financing for U.S. Large Commercial Aircraft, at 
http://www.exim.gov/pressrelease.cfm/6F76B4BA-1032-5B0F-BDC2F28463DF4239/. 
128
 These provisions cannot be modified or excluded by contract. 
129
 Raustiala, supra note __, 603. (there will be “a positive correlation between depth and legality when the 
domestic demandeurs of cooperation are politically privileged, and a negative correlation when they are not.”) 
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 The international law literature contains several definitions of “soft law.” This 
presents a serious conundrum because the definitions contradict. One view holds that “soft 
laws” are pledges and are not laws at all.130 Other scholars define soft law as incorporating 
legal obligations enshrined in “hard law” in a weak form.  According to these scholars, if a 
treaty is worded in a manner that demonstrates no substantive requirements but instead 
consists of largely hortative generalities, then, regardless of the formal nature of the treaty, the 
instrument is “soft law”.131 Under this conception, “hard law” can be “soft” in whole or in 
part. It is unclear if these scholars apply the same standards to “soft law” to determine if the 
obligations therein are actually of a substantive nature and hence more appropriately labeled 
“hard law.” As this description shows, there is very little clarity that appears from this 
taxonomical nightmare. 
 
i. LEGALITY AND SOFT LAW 
 
 Raustiala, while stating that “soft law” is not a coherent concept, argues that states 
“carefully choose the legal nature of their agreements dichotomously.”132 According to him, 
states focus on the binding nature of an agreement as an ex ante certainty when deciding 
whether to enter into an international agreement.133 Thus, a state, when participating in 
international agreement design, will ask itself if it wants to be bound by the agreement in 
question. If the answer is yes, it will be in favor of structuring the agreement in the form of 
“hard law.” If the answer is no, it will be in favor of structuring the agreement in the form of 
“soft law.” This argument does not address the intentions of non-state actors – do non-state 
actors structure agreements in the form of soft law when they do not want to be bound by the 
agreement? 
 
ii. FLEXIBILITY AND SOFT LAW 
 
 A key attribute of “soft law” is perceived flexibility.134 Soft law is flexible in terms of 
substantive provisions, party applicability, the absence ratification requisites, and ultimately 
                                               
130 Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 6, 586. 
131 See R.R. Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite Variety", 29 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 549, 554 (1980); 
Christine Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 I.C.L.Q. 850, 
851 (1989). 
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 Raustiala, supra note 6. 
133
 Id. 
134
 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 6, at 445; Charles Lipson, Why are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 
International Org. 495, 500 (1991) (“[I]nformal bargains are more flexible than treaties. They are willows not 
oaks.”); Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 6, 18. 
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bindingness or impact. Flexibility also pertains to the relevant actors. This is particularly 
important in the transnational commercial law area and seems to have greater explanatory 
power than the other kinds of flexibility discussed by public international law theorists. 
Flexibility in terms of implementation, by executive action rather than ratification, is 
important in the transnational commercial law area because of legislative disinterest and 
apathy.135 Given the rather technical nature of transnational commercial law instruments, 
legislators rarely place them at the top of the legislative agenda. Despite their great 
importance for the economy, they may be trumped on the legislative calendar by the hot 
issues of the day. Legislators worry more about re-election than passing significant 
commercial legislation.  
 
 Flexibility, one scholar argues, is important because of opposing interest group 
pressure.136 Guzman writes that when domestic interest groups are championing international 
agreements they are likely to favor binding conventions because they prefer the most binding 
form possible.137 Accordingly, when competing interest groups collide, states are likely to 
adopt “soft law.” In fact, the evidence in the transnational commercial law area does not 
support this view. International agreements appear to be concluded almost entirely in the 
absence of colliding interest group pressure of any significance. Agreements result almost 
exclusively when dominant interest groups push for them, and in the few instances where 
opposition has materialized, the proposed agreement has been dropped from the legislative 
agenda of the law-making agency.138 
 
iii. NON-ENFORCEABILITY AND SOFT LAW  
 
 Scholars have argued that, by definition, an international law lacking enforceability is 
soft law.139 However, this view is too simplistic. In the context of international private law, 
agreements lacking direct enforcement nevertheless can become binding in some form. One 
example is the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts which were 
drafted almost entirely at the instance of academics without any state involvement 
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 Scholars have argued that implementation flexibility is important when speed is of the essence and/or when 
legislative support is doubtful because of the hostility of legislators to the substantive commitments in the 
international instrument. While this can be a powerful motivation in controversial areas like nuclear weapons 
control, or antiterror activities, legislative boredom is more plausible in the case of franchising conventions and 
conventions on international receivable financing! 
136
 Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, supra note 6. 
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 Id. 
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 The Hoteliers liability convention that was dropped by UNIDROIT is a classic example. 
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 R.R. Baxter, International Law in “Her infinite Variety,” 29 INT’L & COMP. L. Q 549 (1980). 
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(“UNIDROIT Principles”).140 Guided in spirit by the American experience with restatements, 
the demandeurs of the UNIDROIT Principles drafted default rules that could apply when 
parties had not specified in a contract the applicable national law. They were the product of 
wide-ranging comparative law study and created new rules for international contracts. A 
major criticism of the drafting effort is a lack of significant involvement by industry groups. 
 
 Given that the UNIDROIT Principles are expressly nonbinding, there was no need to 
worry about obtaining ratifications from states.  This probably contributed to the willingness 
of the drafters to look beyond existing national approaches.141 The success of the Principles 
must give pause for thought to the drafting agencies whose thinking is convention-centered, 
and there is some evidence that UNIDROIT Principles-like vehicles are being considered 
more seriously than before.142 This is so even where the objective is to reduce great 
divergences in national laws, as in Europe, contradicting the argument that binding 
conventions will be favored in such cases.143  The success of the UNIDROIT Principles 
suggests the merits of incrementalism in agreement design. Demandeurs can employ such 
vehicles to create a favorable climate for a convention in areas that are more amenable. 
Because ratification is unnecessary, these vehicles can be modified readily and parties have 
more choices with regard to substantive provisions.144 They serve educational functions for 
national legislative bodies, and many provisions might become part of national law and hence 
become binding.145 Both the UNIDROIT Principles and the Principles of European Contract 
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 See, Response submitted on behalf of the Society of Public Teachers of Law in Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland (SPTL) to the European Commission’s Communication on Contract Law. The response further states that 
the UNIDROIT Principles could form the basis of a legal “restatement” of contract principles to which 
contracting parties could subscribe on a voluntary basis on a European level. According to them, an English 
court would give effect to a contractual agreement to apply the UNIDROIT Principles in place of the general 
rules of English law. 
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 UNIDROIT, Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Introduction, vii (1994). (“[e]fforts towards 
the international unification of law have hitherto essentially taken the form of binding instruments, such as 
supranational legislation or international conventions, or of model laws. Since these instruments often risk 
remaining little more than a dead letter and tend to be rather fragmentary in character, calls are increasingly 
being made for recourse to non-legislative means of unification or harmonization of law.”) 
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 The Joint Response of the Commission on European Contract Law and Study Group on European Civil Code 
to the Communication on European Contract Law, states the authors’ belief that this is their preferred vehicle for 
European integration. Joint Response, paragraph 33, noting that “[t]he preparation of a restatement of European 
private law is an indispensable foundation for further European legal integration.” 
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 Abbott and Snidal, supra note 6, 423, 438. 
144
 See, ICC Response: “Although ICC would like to express concerns as to whether non-binding principles are 
sufficient, it would like to also emphasize that such principles are an effective first step towards harmonization. 
Important attempts already exist, such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Transactions, 
which are increasingly referred to in international contracts and in arbitration. Another example is the Principles 
of European Contract Law, which ICC considers could serve as an excellent starting point for the harmonization 
of European contract law.” 
145
 See, COMBAR Response: “In our view, the work of the Commission on European Contract Law, and the 
Study Group on a European Civil Code is valuable, and should be supported. A “Restatement” of contract law, 
which is what we would expect to be the end result, though not in itself binding, may be expected to “harden” 
into law, for example, by influencing the judicial process. At the least, where a provision of national contract law 
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Law (PECL) have been consulted extensively by national legislators, including sophisticated 
jurisdictions like Germany, Scotland, and Spain.146 Flexibility can also benefit contracting 
parties to the extent that courts and arbitral tribunals are willing to recognize party autonomy 
to choose non-state law to govern their contracts. 147 In the European Union, efforts to 
increase party autonomy to facilitate the choice of the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL 
reached a crescendo in calls for amendments to the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Contracts.148 This is truly remarkable, because a piece of binding law is sought to be 
amended to allow resort to non-binding law that can displace the national laws of the 
contracting states. In addition to legislative efforts, the receptivity of national courts to 
international restatements can play a major role in their bindingness.149 
 
iv. THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES 
 
The UNIDROIT Principles were drafted by a group of leading experts on commercial law.150 
These experts included academics, judges, and civil servants, but not industry actors. The 
members of the drafting group had no affiliations with states and were appointed entirely for 
                                                                                                                                                   
diverges from those as stated in principles, courts may be encouraged to consider whether such divergence is in 
fact justified by reference to conditions obtaining in the country concerned.” 
146
 Joint Response, paragraph 37. 
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 In Professor Goode’s view the PECL and the UNIDROIT Principles have been successful “precisely because 
they are not binding, have not been influenced by governments and do not pose any threat to national legal 
systems. Like the UNCITRAL Model Law on Arbitration they are designed to be a unifying influence and a 
resource, but it is left to legislatures, courts and arbitral tribunals to decide to what extent they assist in the 
solution of problems.” See, Prof. Goode’s Response to the European Commission’s Communication on a 
European Civil Code. He also notes that the UNIDROIT Principles have been “widely applied by arbitral 
tribunals, and even by some courts, and have influenced national legislation in a number of countries.” Id. 
148
 The Joint Response notes that party autonomy can be facilitated even more if the Rome Convention were to 
allow the application of restatements. (“[o]ffering an additional legal system to choose as the governing law for a 
contract would go a long way beyond merely offering terms that can be incorporated into an agreement. It would 
represent a very substantial and effective enhancement of the parties’ autonomy because the law at their disposal 
would be one which is pan-European and non-partisan in nature and which will therefore have immediate appeal 
as an escape from the battle of choosing one or other of the parties’ national laws.”) Id. Paragraph. 36. The 
European Commission submitted a draft in December 2005 to amend Article 3 to provide: “[t]he parties may 
also choose as the applicable law the principles and rules of the substantive law of contract recognised 
internationally or in the Community [. . .].” See, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), COM (2005) 650 final (Dec. 15, 2005). 
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 See, Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on European contract law’ writing that, “in Europe recognition of these 
private ‘codes’ by national judges when interpreting contract clauses, clarifying the intention of the parties or 
settling disputes is a problem, while elsewhere, non-State law can be taken into account, as is the case, for 
example, under the Mexico Convention.” OJ C 241, dated 7.10.2002. 
150
 The members of the working group (part II) included Bonell (Italy), Baptista (Brazil), Crepeau (Canada), 
Date Bah (Ghana), Di Majo (Italy), El Kholy (Egypt), Farnsworth (United States), Finn (Australia), Fontaine 
(Belgium), Furmston (U.K.), Hartkamp (Netherlands), Huang (China), Jauffret-Spinosi (France), Komarov 
(Russia), Lando (Denmark), Schlectreim (Germany), and Uchida (Japan). 
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their expertise.151 This enabled a more ecumenical approach to drafting and did not foreclose 
the possibility of inventing solutions that were foreign to national legal systems.152  
 
 In less than two decades the Principles have attained a modicum of success in 
attracting the attention of courts, arbitral tribunals, and national legislatures. Its status as the 
embodiment of the current state of the art of international contract law motivated national 
legislators to refer to it in the process of enacting new legislation.153 For example, the drafting 
of the Russian Civil Code, the Estonian Law of Obligations, and the Civil Code of the 
Republic of Lithuania, all witnessed resort to the Principles.154  
 
 The demandeurs expressly decided against structuring the UNIDROIT Principles as a 
convention. However, that has not prevented the UNIDROIT Principles from being 
enforceable either by contractual incorporation or by tribunals even in cases where contracts 
made no reference to them. Such use will likely grow if Article 3 of the proposed Rome I 
Regulation155 of the EU is issued allowing contracting parties to choose non-state contract law 
to govern their contract.156 
 
 Courts have referred to the Principles in several countries, including the U.S. In 
Ministry Of Defense and Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. 
Cubic Defense Systems, Inc.,157 one of the questions before the court was whether the arbitral 
tribunal’s application of the UNIDROIT Principles was a ground for vacatur of the award 
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 Arthur Rosett, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: A New Approach to 
International Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 348 (1998). (“immensely valuable to those who 
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 M. J. Bonell, "An International Restatement of Contract Law", (2nd ed., 1997) 236 et seq; M. Williams, ‘An 
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under article V (1)(c) of the New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. The defendant argued that such use of the Principles exceeded the 
scope of the Terms of Reference. The court was unimpressed: “[t]he reference to the 
UNIDROIT Principles does not exceed the scope of the Terms of Reference….The Tribunal's 
reference to and application of the UNIDROIT Principles and principles such as good faith 
and fair dealing do not violate Article V(1)(c).”158 
 
 In Great Hill Equity Partners II LP v. Novator One LP,159 the question was whether 
certain statements made during pre-contractual negotiations could be used to construe the 
agreement.160 The court referred to the UNIDROIT Principles alongside the CISG for the 
proposition that all relevant circumstances must be considered in construing the intention of 
the parties.161 A similar question arose in The Square Mile Partnership Limited v. Fitzmaurice 
McCall Limited,162 and the court once again referred to article 4.3 of the Principles in addition 
to scholarly commentary.163 In Econet Satellite Services Ltd v. Vee Networks Ltd,164 the 
parties had a clause in the contract stating that it shall be “interpreted in accordance with the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts of the International Institute for 
the Unification of Private Laws [1994] as then in force, applied mutatis mutandis to the extent 
not inconsistent therewith.” There was no objection to this by the Queen’s Bench. 
 
 In an Argentinean case in 2004,165 despite no reference to the UNIDROIT Principles 
in the contract, which was between a bank and its customer concerning a credit card issued by 
the former, the court explicitly referred to article 2.4 of the Principles as an exemplar of 
“modern law.”166 There are six Australian cases listed on the Unilex database that have 
referred to the Principles. In Hughes Aircraft Systems International v. Airservices 
                                               
158
 Id. at 1173. 
159
 [2007] EWHC 1210 (Comm) (2007). 
160
 A similar point arose in Proforce Recruit Limited v. The Rugby Group Limited, [2006] EWCA Civ 69. See 
also, Svenska Petroleum Exploration Ab v. Government Of The Republic Of Lithuania (No 2), [2005] EWHC 
2437 (Comm). 
161
 “The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts give primacy to the common intention of 
the parties and on questions of interpretation requires regard to be had to all the circumstances, including the pre-
contractual negotiations of the parties ( article 4.3 ).” Id. at paragraph 57. 
162
 [2006] EWCA Civ 1690 (2006). See, Anna Rogowska, CISG in UK: How Does The CISG Govern The 
Contractual Relations Of English Businessmen, I.C.C.L.R. 2007, 18(7), 226-230 (“the decisions are particularly 
important for the future development of English law; they raise the status of the two international instruments in 
the English courts, granting them a greater level of acceptance and popularity.”) 
163
 Id. at paragraph 62. 
164
 [2006] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 423. 
165
 Case dated 10.6.2004, decision of the Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial de la Capital Federal 
(CNCom Sala B), available at http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1. 
166
 Id. 
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Australia,167 the court noted that the Anglo-Australian law on the duty of fair dealing was 
indecisive, but that “[i]t has been propounded as a fundamental principle to be honoured in 
international commercial contracts” by the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts in Article 1.7,168 and held that “recognition [of the duty] in our own 
contract law is now warranted.” This decision was cited with approval by the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales in Alcatel Australia Ltd. v. Scarcella & Ors.169 In Aiton v. Transfield,170 
the dispute was about the proper construction of a clause in the agreement which provided 
that “[t]he Purchaser [Transfield] and Supplier [Aiton] shall make diligent and good faith 
efforts to resolve all [d]isputes.” The court noted the “interest generated by international 
instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
…which specifically refer to a requirement of "good faith" in contracts” and held that the 
clause was enforceable.171  
 
 A similar question arose before the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Central 
Exchange Ltd v Anaconda Nickel Ltd.172 The court referred to Hughes Aircraft Systems and 
seemed inclined to imply a duty of good faith. A more significant decision for the authority of 
the Principles is GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd. v BHP Information Techology Pty Ltd.173 
Despite the contract being subject to the domestic law of Australia, the court referred to 
articles 1.7, 2.1.8,174 and 6.14175 of the UNIDROIT Principles. In Tan Hung Nguyen v Luxury 
Design Homes,176 also a case involving the application of domestic law, the court referred to 
article 6.14, comment 2, to find that complete performance was not a condition for the 
payment obligation. The Principles were recently cited by the High Court of Delhi in a purely 
domestic dispute between two parties over the consummation of a sale agreement for an 
apartment despite the fact that the circumstances would ordinarily not have led to them being 
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 Federal Court of Australia, 30.6.1997, available at 
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1. 
168
 Article 1.7: “(1) Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in international 
Trade; (2) The parties may not exclude or limit this duty.” 
169
 Available at http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1. 
170
 [1999] NSWSC 996, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/supreme_ct/1999/996.html. 
171
 Supreme Court of NSW, 01.10.1999, Available at 
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1. 
172
 Available at http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1. 
173
 Id. 
174
 “ARTICLE 2.1.8 (Acceptance within a fixed period of time): A period of acceptance fixed by the offeror 
begins to run from the time that the offer is dispatched. A time indicated in the offer is deemed to be the time of 
dispatch unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.” 
175
 ARTICLE 6.1.4 (Order of performance): (1) To the extent that the performances of the parties can be 
rendered simultaneously, the parties are bound to render them simultaneously unless the circumstances indicate 
otherwise; (2) To the extent that the performance of only one party requires a period of time, that party is bound 
to render its performance first, unless the circumstances indicate otherwise.” 
176
 [2004] NSWCA 178 (11 June 2004), available at 
http://unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1. 
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applicable.177 This is the only court decision from India citing the Principles on the Unilex 
database. 
 
 Courts have rejected arguments against application of the UNIDROIT Principles in 
arbitration because they are beyond the submission to arbitration. In a recent French case, 
Société FORASOL v. Société mixte Franco-Kazakh CISTM,178 where French law governed the 
contract and the arbitrator had referenced the UNIDROIT Principles as a “codification of 
trade usages”, the court apparently approved of such reference when the chosen law was 
unclear on the particular topic and held that it was not beyond the terms of arbitration. A 
similar challenge, albeit where a court applied the UNIDROIT Principles notwithstanding the 
fact that domestic law governed the contract, is on appeal in the Chinese case of Hengxing 
Company v. Guangdong Petrochemical Subsidiary Company.179 In a Russian arbitration, the 
claimant objected to the respondent’s invocation of the UNIDROIT Principles when Russian 
law was the governing law, and the tribunal refused to apply the Principles due to the 
objection.180 
 
 Some courts have made it clear that the Principles are not binding, but cited them as 
confirming international consensus on a particular issue.181 A Swiss court indicated that the 
UNIDROIT Principles could be chosen by the parties to apply to their contract despite being 
“anational law” because they are “transnational in character and sufficiently coherent.”182 The 
judgment of this court was reversed on appeal, but the Supreme Court endorsed the lower 
court with regard to the parties’ ability to choose the Principles to govern their contract.183 
Arbitral tribunals have been favorable to parties choosing the Principles despite the existence 
of domestic law. In a recent award rendered by the Centro de Arbitraje de México (CAM) 
where the parties were Mexican and American, but had chosen the UNIDROIT Principles to 
                                               
177
 Sandvik Asia Pvt. Ltd. v. Vardhman Promoters Pvt. Ltd., 
http://unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13617  (“UNIDROIT Principles, Article 4.4. All terms in 
the contract must be given effect rather than deprive some of them of the effect.”). 
178
 Cour d'appel de Paris (1er Ch.C.), available at 
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1. 
179
 The appeal is from the decision of the Guangdong Intermediate People’s Court, available at 
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1. 
180
 International Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, No. 
174/2003, 12.11.2004, available at http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13620&x=1. 
181
 See, Tribunale Padova - Sez. Este decision dated 10.1.2006, where the court held that unless otherwise agreed 
to by the parties, the place of delivery was the place where the seller handed over the goods to the first carrier 
stating that "this solution is confirmed by two other equally autonomous, though not binding, instruments such as 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (Art. 6.1.6(1)) and the Principles of European 
Contract Law (Art. 7:101(1)(b))". 
182
 Decision of the Bundesgericht, dated 20.12.2005. 
183
 Decision of the Handelsgericht St.Gallen, dated 12.11.2004 available at unilex.info. 
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govern the contract, the Tribunal resorted to Article 1445 of the Mexican Commercial Code 
which allowed it to decide the dispute according to the “rules of law” chosen by the parties.184 
In the Tribunal’s view, the status of the UNIDROIT Principles and its application in many 
international arbitral proceedings gave it the status of “rules of law.” 
 
 One Italian court refused to resort to the Principles when the contract was governed by 
English law.185 A more friendly attitude was adopted by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand 
which, despite the fact that domestic New Zealand law was applicable to the contract, desired 
to make  
[r]eference … to the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
published in 1994.This document, which is in the nature of a restatement of the 
commercial contract law of the world, refines and expands the principles 
contained in the United Nations Convention. Particularly relevant for present 
purposes is Article 4.3.Having stipulated that a contract is to be interpreted 
according to the common intention of the parties (4.1), and that the statements 
and other conduct of a party shall be interpreted according to that party's 
intention if the other party knew or could not have been unaware of that 
intention (4.2), Article 4.3 provides that, in applying these general principles, 
regard should be had to all the circumstances including "preliminary 
negotiations between the parties". Clearly, it is desirable that the approach of 
the Courts in this country to the interpretation of statutes should be consistent 
with the best international practice.(internal citations omitted).186  
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Poland, in concluding that penalty clauses are valid despite 
the nonbreaching party suffering no damage, said that “the view expressed in this resolution is 
supported by legal solutions found in regulations of international contract law pertaining to 
the institution of contractual penalties,” specifically “[i]n Art. 7.4.13 [of the] UNIDROIT 
Principles … [which] state[s] that if a contract provides for the payment of penalty in case of 
default, then the other party shall have the right to claim the agreed amount, regardless of the 
scope of the incurred damage.”187 A novel approach to the application of the Principles can be 
                                               
184
 Centro de Arbitraje de México (CAM), 30.11.2006. 
185
 Universal Pictures International No 2 BV v. Curatela Del Fallimento Academy Pictures S.R.L, Tribunale 
Rovereto, 15.03.2007, available at http://unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13617. 
186
 Hideo Yoshimoto v Canterbury Golf International Limited, (2000) NZCA 350, Available at 
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1. 
187
 Case no. III CZP 61/03, Supreme Court of Poland, available at 
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1. 
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found in the decision of a Costa Rican arbitral tribunal concluding that there was a duty of 
good faith: 
Without applying them as a source of law not agreed upon or invoked by the 
parties, but instead for their doctrinal value, it is relevant to recall that the 
[Principles] were repeatedly applied in several awards of the I.C.C. 
International Court of Arbitration up until 1998 and also in domestic 
arbitration. These Principles are the result of years of intensive comparative 
investigation and deliberation carried out by a group of selected legal experts 
from the most diverse legal systems …. 188  
In another Costa Rican arbitration, the tribunal applied the Principles because they were the 
“central component” of the rules governing international contracts.189 
 
 The Principles have found application even in a public international law dispute 
between sovereign states before a UN forum. The United Nations Compensation 
Commission, in determining whether Iraq was liable to pay compensation for its illegal 
invasion of Kuwait, expressly referred to the Principles for the proposition that a court has 
discretion in determining the amount of compensation, and for the proposition that a party has 
the duty to mitigate damages.190 The Supreme Court of Venezuela, in coming to the 
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 Arbitration Centre of the Costa Rican Chamber of Commerce, 01.06.2003, available at 
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13620&x=1. 
189Ad hoc arbitration (San José, Costa Rica), 30.04.2001, available at 
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13620&x=1. The Tribunal said: “The reasons why this 
Tribunal considers the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts to be the central component 
of the general rules and principles regulating international contractual obligations and enjoying wide 
international consensus, which constitute the proper law of the contracts, are manifold: (1) the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts are a restatement of international legal principles applicable to 
international commercial contracts prepared by a distinguished group of international experts coming from all 
prevailing legal systems of the world, without the intervention of States or governments, both circumstances 
contributing to the high quality and neutrality of the product and its ability to reflect the present state of 
consensus on international legal rules and principles governing international contractual obligations in the world, 
primarily on the basis of their fairness and appropriateness for international commercial transactions falling 
within their purview; (2) at the same time, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts are 
largely inspired by an international uniform law text already enjoying wide international recognition and 
generally considered as reflecting international trade usages and practice in the field of the international sale of 
goods, which has already been ratified by almost 40 countries, namely CISG; (3) the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts are specially adapted to the contracts subject of this arbitration, since they 
cover both the international sale of goods and supply of services; (4) the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts have been specifically conceived to apply to international contracts in instances in which, 
as is the case in these proceedings, it has been found that the parties have agreed that their transactions shall be 
governed by general legal rules and principles; (5) rather than vague principles or general guidelines, the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts are mostly constituted by clearly enunciated and 
specific rules coherently organized in a systematic way.” 
190
 Panel of the Commissioners, Panel F1, Recommendation S/AC.26, dated 23.09.1997, available at 
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1. The panel referred to arts. 7.1.7, 7.3.5, 
7.3.6, 7.4.3(3), 7.4.8(1),(2) and 7.4.9. The panel stated in a footnote: “This [duty of mitigation] is a general 
principle of law. Compare UNIDROIT Principles, art. 7.4.8(1). ("The non performing party is not liable for harm 
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conclusion that a contract was international for the purposes of upholding the validity of an 
arbitration clause for arbitration in New York when both parties were Venezuelan, expressly 
referred to the comment to the preamble of the UNIDROIT Principles which provides that 
"[…] the concept of 'international' contracts should be given the broadest possible 
interpretation, so as to ultimately exclude only those situations where no international element 
at all is involved, i.e. where all the relevant elements of the contract in question are connected 
with one country only."191 
 
 The growing use of the Principles by courts and arbitral tribunals suggests that 
demandeurs can be successful in creating legal agreements even when they possess no direct 
mechanisms for legalization. This success must be qualified by the fact that the Principles 
have usually only be used by courts in a supportive capacity rather than to determine the 
dispute. Despite this caution, the cases illustrate that if key constituencies like arbitrators and 
judges can be co-opted, non-legal agreements can attain legal significance by reference and 
incorporation. Similarly, lawyers can foster bindingness by incorporating non-legal 
agreements into private contracts. These strategies are vital if the demandeurs are academics 
and not industry groups because they do not possess much economic or political clout. There 
is some evidence that the UNIDROIT Principles have become successful because the 
demandeurs have been successful in selling the product to key constituencies.192  
 
 
C. DEMANDEURS CHOOSE DEEP NON-LEGAL AGREEMENTS WHEN THEY ARE 
INTEGRATED  
 
i. THE WORK OF THE ICC 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
suffered by the aggrieved party to the extent that the harm could have been reduced by the latter party's taking 
reasonable steps.") 
191
 Bottling Companies v. Pepsi Cola Panamericana, 09.10.1997, available at 
http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=13619&x=1. 
192
 Klaus Peter Berger, ‘The Central Enquiry On The Use Of Transnational Law In International Contract Law 
And Arbitration: Background, Procedure And Selected Results’, Int. A.L.R. 2000 3 (5), 145-156. It confirmed 
many of the findings of UNIDROIT, which had conducted a study of about 1000 users of the UNIDROIT 
Principles to obtain information about the practical application of the Principles. Although the response rates are 
very low, and may be skewed by the fact that many of the uses have been in the context of arbitration, it is 
definitely indicative of the fact that the sheer quality of the Principles are causing commercial players to resort to 
them. 
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 Arguably the most successful example of demandeurs from industry creating 
international agreements is the work of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).193 
Two of its most successful agreements are the Uniform Customs and Practice for 
Documentary Credits (UCP 600),194 the rules that banks apply to finance billions of dollars 
worth of world trade, and the ICC Incoterms, the standard international trade definitions used 
in thousands of contracts.195. The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits 
(UCP) were introduced in 1933, and the area has been surprisingly immune from intervention 
by states.196 Banks in over 145 nations use the UCP, which has been revised in 1951, 1974, 
1983, 1993, and 2006.197 It is estimated that the UCP governs ninety-five percent of all 
international letters of credit.198 The UCP are not binding ipso facto, and depend on the parties 
incorporating them through the contract.199 The lack of a need for state involvement and 
ratification facilitated this process of amendment and clarification. Amendments were 
preceded by studies showing that letters of credit were being rejected in significant 
numbers.200 Prior to the commencement of most recent revision in 2003, “global surveys 
indicated that, because of discrepancies, approximately 70% of documents presented under 
letters of credit were being rejected on first presentation.”201 
 
 A similar reason had motivated the adoption of the International Standard Banking 
Practice for the Examination of Documents under Documentary Credits (the "ISBP") in 
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 The ICC was founded in 1919 “to further the development of an open world economy with the firm 
conviction that international commercial exchanges are conducive to both greater global prosperity and peace 
among nations.” See, Preamble to ICC Constitution, available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/ICC_Home_Page/pages/Constitution8101907E.pdf. The ICC 
International Court of Arbitration was set up in 1923, and is the leading center for the resolution of international 
commercial disputes. See, http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html. 
194
 See, Foreword to the UCP600: “The UCP remain the most successful set of private rules for trade ever 
developed.” 
195
 The Incoterms were originally published in 1936 following a study conducted in a decade earlier showing that 
trade terms were understood and applied differently by different legal systems. In the case of a dispute between 
the parties to a contract, the result could depend on the lex fori and on the law governing the contract. See, 
Charles del Busto, ICC Guide to Documentary Credit Operations, ICC Pub. No. 515 (1994), 13. 
196
 See, Robert Bradgate & Fidelma White, ‘Into the 21st Century’, Law Society’s Gazette, Vol. 89 No. 41 p 19. 
197
 Id. 
198
 See, http://www.ucp600.tk/index.html; See, E. P. Ellinger, "The UCP-500: Considering a New Revision" 
[2004] L.M.C.L.Q. 30; Ross P. Buckley, ‘The 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice For 
Documentary Credits’, 28 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 265, 266 (1995). 
199
 Article 1 of the UCP 600 states that they “are rules that apply to any documentary credit (“credit”) (including, 
to the extent to which they may be applicable, any standby letter of credit) when the text of the credit expressly 
indicates that it is subject to these rules. They are binding on all parties thereto unless expressly modified or 
excluded by the credit.” 
200
 Gao Xiang & Ross Buckley, ‘The Unique Jurisprudence of Letters of Credit: Its Origin and Sources’ , 4 San 
Diego Int'l L.J. 91 (2003) 
201
 UCP600, Introduction, at 2. (“This [has] a negative effect on the letter of credit being seen as a means of 
payment and, if unchecked, could have serious implications for maintaining or increasing its market share as a 
recognized means of settlement in international trade. The introduction by banks of a discrepancy fee has 
highlighted the importance of this issue, especially when the underlying discrepancies have been found to be 
dubious or unsound.”) 
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2002.202 Highlighting the rapidity of agreement design without state involvement, the ISBP 
were completed in just two years. The UCP 600 revision process took about three years.203 
While there was extensive consultation within the organization, the lack of meaningful access 
to outsiders is a cause for concern. The predominance of demandeurs – in this case, the 
banking sector–in the drafting process explains the success of the instrument, but the 
possibility of negative externalities has to be considered by state actors.204 If the UCP 600 
imposes significant externalities, one might expect regulatory competition to ensue to the 
extent that it can withstand the objections of the banking industry. 
 
ii. AGREEMENTS IN COMMODITIES MARKETS 
 
 There are several examples of demandeur-centric agreement design in the 
commodities sector, typically characterized by integrated industry groups, which are 
examined below. One example is the Refined Sugar Association (RSA), which was founded 
in 1891. One of its objectives is to draft rules and regulations “required for the proper conduct 
of the white sugar trade in the United Kingdom and international markets.”205 The RSA has 
over one-hundred members representing about 40 states. The council of the association is the 
organ responsible for drafting rules for the international white sugar trade. These rules are 
used by the majority of international companies trading white sugar.206 The Association 
provides for arbitration of disputes and has detailed rules for its arbitration procedure when 
the contract includes a clause subjecting it to arbitration before the association.207 A key rule 
provides that parties may not approach the courts until the tribunal issues an award.208 
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 Id. Prof. Rosett commends the ICC: “The ability of the International Chamber of Commerce to regularly 
review and revise these definitions is impressive.” Arthur Rosett, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts: A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts’, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 347, 353 
(1998). The UCP600 Introduction notes that “[the ISBP] has evolved into a necessary companion to the UCP for 
determining compliance of documents with the terms of letters of credit.” UCP600, Introduction, supra note __, 
at 3. 
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 Id. 
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 Arthur Rosett, ‘The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: A New Approach to 
International Commercial Contracts’, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 347, 353 (1998). 
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 http://www.sugarassociation.co.uk/rsa/index.htm 
206
 Id. 
207
 The association recommends that parties to White Sugar contracts include the following clause in their 
agreement: “"Any disputes arising out of or in connection with this Contract shall be referred to arbitration 
before The Refined Sugar Association for settlement in accordance with the Rules Relating to Arbitration. Such 
arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with English Law. This contract shall be governed by and 
construed in accordance with English Law".” 
208
 Section 6: “Unless the Council shall as hereinbefore provided have refused to arbitrate, neither the Buyer, 
Seller, Trustee in Bankruptcy, liquidator nor any other person claiming under any of them, shall bring any action 
against any party to the contract in respect of any dispute arising out of such contract, until such dispute shall 
have been adjudicated upon in arbitration under these Rules; and the obtaining of an award under these Rules 
shall be a condition precedent to the right of either contracting party to sue the other in respect of any claim 
arising out of the contract.” 
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Further, in another example of externalities being imposed on third parties, the rules provide 
that the contract shall be deemed to have been made in England, and that England shall be 
deemed to be the place of performance notwithstanding any provision to the contrary.209 The 
rules also exclude the CISG unless there is an express statement to the contrary in the 
contract.210 The seat of the arbitration is England.211 Parties are not entitled to a hearing before 
the tribunal, which may make a determination purely based on written submissions at its 
discretion.212 Central to the success of the arbitration system are the deployment of 
reputational sanctions by the association. The rules expressly provide that the association can 
publicize the names of parties who do not adhere to arbitral awards.213 This is likely to ensure 
that parties do not challenge arbitral awards in courts and fosters finality. 
 
 The Sugar Association of London was established in 1882 to provide rules for the 
conduct of the raw sugar trade.214 The association has over eighty members from over forty 
countries comprising trading houses, refiners, and producers.215 It also provides for arbitration 
of disputes which include a clause in the agreement providing for such arbitration, and the 
rules contain a provision embargoing resort to the courts pending issuance of the award.216 
The CISG is similarly excluded unless a specific incorporating provision is contained in the 
contract.217 The rules also provide for “circularizing” details about parties who do not abide 
by arbitral awards.218 
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 Section 8 provides that “For the purpose of all proceedings in arbitration, the contract shall be deemed to have 
been made in England, any correspondence in reference to the offer, the acceptance, the place of payment or 
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 “Unless the contract contains any statement expressly to the contrary, the provisions of neither the 
Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, of 1964, nor the United Nations 
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receive the aforesaid notice and Constitution Rules 7 and 8 may be invoked by the Council.” 
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 http://www.sugarassociation.co.uk/sal/index.htm 
215
 http://www.sugarassociation.co.uk/sal/members.htm 
216
 Section 406, available at http://www.sugarassociation.co.uk/sal/arbitrationrules.htm. 
217
 Section 408. 
218
 Section 416. 
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 The Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations (FOSFA) puts forth contracts and 
conducts arbitration for the world trade in oilseeds, oils and fats.219 It has over 830 members 
in 76 countries, comprising producers, processors, shippers, dealers, traders, brokers and 
agents in oilseeds, oils, and fats.220 Its clout is demonstrated by the fact that 85% of the world 
trade in these commodities is conducted under its contracts.221 These contracts contain 
arbitration clauses that subject disputes to FOFSA arbitration.222 Parties are barred from 
approaching the courts until the tribunal has issued an award.223 Surprisingly, parties cannot 
be represented by legal counsel.224 Parties have a right to appeal to the Federation, again 
without representation at the hearing by legal counsel.225 The Federation also deploys 
reputational sanctions against parties who do not comply with awards: “the Council of the 
Federation may post on the Federation's notice Board and/or circularise to members in any 
way thought fit notification to that effect.”226 The Guide notes that “[j]ust to be told of the 
possible consequences of his neglect or refusal is often enough to cause a party to honour the 
award.”227 Clearly, this sanctioning power allows agreements that lack the traditional features 
of law to perform similar functions. 
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 "Neither party hereto, nor any persons claiming under either of them, shall bring any action or other legal 
proceedings against the other of them in respect of any such dispute until such dispute shall first have been heard 
and determined by the arbitrators, umpire or Board of Appeal (as the case may be) in accordance with the Rules 
of Arbitration and Appeal of the Federation and it is hereby expressly agreed and declared that the obtaining of 
any award from the arbitrators, umpire or Board of Appeal (as the case may be), shall be a condition precedent to 
the right of either party hereto or of any person claiming under either of them to bring any action or other legal 
proceedings against the other of them in respect of any such dispute." 
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 The American Cotton Shipper’s Association’s member firms handle over 80% of the 
U.S. cotton sold in domestic and foreign markets.228 The Association requires its “members 
… to honor all contracts, to attempt to resolve quality and technical disputes through amicable 
settlement, to submit disputes incapable of settlement to binding arbitration, and to honor the 
arbitration award.”229 The Association has detailed arbitration rules which apply to 
arbitrations between members, and between members and nonmembers with their consent.230 
The association’s arbitration process is not available to members in default.231 Upon 
institution of a complaint, the association submits a contract to both parties providing that 
they shall abide by the award.232 However, this seems to be a contract without much choice 
because section 5(b) provides that  
[s]hould either party refuse to sign the contract for arbitration or agree to the 
arbitration then the Executive Vice President shall pursuant to Article 12 of the 
By-Laws appoint an Arbitration Committee who shall proceed with the 
arbitration "ex parte." In such event, the parties shall be deemed to have agreed 
to the provisions of the contract described in this subsection, and the decision 
of the Arbitration Committee shall be binding on both parties to the 
controversy, subject to the right of appeal. 
 The element of pressure to arbitrate is also found in section 5(d) whereby members have a 
duty to sign the contract within fifteen days.233 Oral arguments come at a price–the party 
requesting it has to pay for the expense of the hearing.234 
 
 Many commodities business associations resort to reputational sanctions to give teeth 
to their agreements. Significant obstacles to their effective deployment have been reduced by 
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 Section 3(a)(3): “(3) The Arbitration Committee will not consider a dispute of a member or a non-member of 
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the pervasiveness of the Internet in commercial transactions. Bad reputation was hard to 
convey because of the limitations of traditional media. Further, shunning businesses with bad 
reputations might have come at a cost because of informational costs associated with finding 
substitute partners. Both difficulties are solved by websites managed by industry associations. 
The American Cotton Exporters Association (ACEA), another industry body with a 
significant membership, publishes a default list on its website with a star indicating that the 
defaulter, in addition to defaulting on a contract, has also failed to comply with an arbitral 
award.235 The most recent list of defaulters includes companies from countries including 
Bangladesh, China, India, Greece, El Salvador, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Philippines, and 
Turkey. The Committee for International Cooperation between Cotton Associations 
(CICCA),236 based in Liverpool, England, publishes a list of defaulters on its website that 
names companies that failed to comply with arbitral awards issued by recognized arbitral 
bodies.237 The largest number of defaulters appear to be from India, Bangladesh, and 
Pakistan.238 At this time, there are a total of 263 defaulters.239 The World Cotton Exporters 
Association (WCEA) also publishes a list of defaulters. It states that “the mere listing of a 
party in default is not to be construed as a prohibition against dealing with that party. Each 
participant should exercise his own business judgement as to the use of the list…”240 The 
WCEA defines default for purposes of inclusion in the list.241 The list has over 45 
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 “For the purpose of the operation of these procedures, a party shall be deemed to be in default when: (A) In 
the case of contracts calling for the opening of a letter or letters of credit for the benefit of the exporter, the 
purchaser has failed to open a letter of credit in accordance with the terms of the contract or other agreements on 
or prior to the last day of shipment month; or refused to extend an L/C if requested by the exporter; or opened 
the L/C with insufficient time to load; or added other clauses designed to make the L/C inoperable; (B) In the 
case of contracts made on CAD, COA, FOB, FAS, C & F, and CIF terms, payment has not been received by the 
exporter in the ordinary and usual course of business; (C) In the case of contracts calling for shipment to the 
exporter, the seller fails to make shipment according to the terms of the contract or other agreement on or prior to 
the last day of the shipment month; (D) In any case where the party has definitely notified the exporter of his 
intention not to honor the contract. (E) Notwithstanding the above, if the party has agreed to submit the dispute 
to arbitration, and to abide by the award, the exporter shall not add such party to the Default List.” 
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companies.242 It is curious that defaulting companies appear to be principally from third-world 
countries. 
 
 The Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) has been at work since 1878 “to 
promote the international trade.”243 Its members use its contracts, which contain arbitration 
rules. The rules provide detailed procedures for arbitration and review of awards.244 One 
author notes that GAFTA is “able to provide disputants with an effective means for ensuring 
the issuance of accurate awards and to recognize parties' interests in designing an arbitration 
process to fit their needs.”245 Like the sugar associations, GAFTA contracts also create the 
legal fiction that the contract was concluded in England and choose English law as the law 
governing the contract.246 GAFTA arbitration awards have been enforced by courts in several 
countries.247 
 
 The above examples illustrate the complete absence of state involvement in areas 
where demandeurs are tightly integrated and possess enforcement power. A consultation 
process that focuses on the states which have the highest number of defaulters on the lists of 
these demandeurs might provide insights into the implications of states ceding regulatory 
authority over large areas of economic activity. If there are disproportionate burdens being 
placed on businesses from these countries, there might be the possibility for regulatory 
competition to redress the balance. There is room for competition because the procedures 
followed by many trade associations are designed to facilitate expeditious dispute resolution 
rather than to provide the kinds of checks and balances that characterize traditional state-
based systems. If the systemic flaws are compromising due process requirements, other 
suppliers of better mechanisms might be able to compete effectively. 
 
iii. AIR TRANSPORT 
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 The International Air Transport Association (IATA), founded in 1945, is comprised of 
over 270 member airlines from over 140 nations.248 It serves as a link between the world’s air 
carriers and develops commercial standards. IATA arbitration rules provide that parties waive 
their right to judicial relief by submission to arbitration.249 It also commits the parties to 
enforcing the award within thirty days.250 Recognizing that the limits on liability provided in 
the Warsaw Convention have not been amended in several decades, the IATA crafted an 
agreement amongst carriers to waive the limits of liability.251 The Agreement requires the 
parties to waive limits on liability for compensation in respect of “claims for death, wounding 
or other bodily injury of a passenger within the meaning of Article 17 of the Convention.”252 
Under the agreement, the limits on liability will be determined by the law of the domicile of 
the passenger.253 Thereafter, IATA drafted an Agreement on Measures to Implement the 
Intercarrier Agreement.254 This Agreement had 95 signatories as of 2005.255 The Intercarrier 
Agreement had 131 signatories as of the same date.256 The IATA is also a highly integrated 
demandeur and its agreements support the view that conventions are sought only when state 
involvement is necessary. 
 
D. DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT 
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Some may criticize demandeur-centric agreement design because it supplants states, 
which supposedly are democratic entities, with private entities. However, this claim is 
dubious given that democratic participation is lacking even when states are the driving forces. 
Also, the bulk of the work in drafting international commercial agreements has been done by 
technical experts from the major developed countries with minimal participation from third-
world countries.257 These experts are not elected and are not democratically accountable. For 
example, although the Governing Council of UNIDROIT included persons nominated by 
member states, these experts are not bound to follow any instructions issued by their 
nominating states.258 This might have its advantages if the expert acts perfectly, but if he does 
not, the agency cost can be significant. Frequently, work continues for several years before 
the wider community is aware of the substantive content of any instrument that is being 
drafted. It is unclear if the consultation processes that exist in many organizations are 
meaningfully applicable to nonmembers. Drafts are not always available in a timely manner 
on public databases. In this context, the choice of a convention as the vehicle ushers in the 
possibility of some (minimal) democratic oversight at the ratification stage.  
 
Inevitably, the democratic nature of an international commercial agreement will 
depend on the constitutional structure of states and their ratification process. Not every state 
conducts hearings and consultations on international agreements; thus, in such states, the 
democratic deficit persists. One could argue that, even in cases with a democratic ratification 
process, legislatures are only presented with a binary take-it-or-leave-it choice, subject to the 
possibility of declarations and reservations. Also, regardless of ratification, international 
commercial conventions are created by experts who do not face the same scrutiny as elected 
representatives. Demandeurs may perceive insulation from political battles as an advantage: 
they may be unwilling to pay the costs of delay in ratification when the subject matter of the 
agreement is a matter of immediate concern. The demandeurs might be fearful of opposition 
from contrary interest groups who could to use the legislative process to derail the agreement. 
These are just a few of the possibilities that suggest themselves.  
 
E. REGULATORY COMPETITION 
 
 The demandeur-centric approach recognizes the competition between state and non-
state actors, political institutions intra-state, and among international organizations. 
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Traditional theories have ignored this competition and assume that their objectives are largely 
complementary. They also presume that states possess the power to subsume and subdue non-
state entities. This explains their understanding of how the states are mediating demandeurs 
and designing agreements considering the preferences of these groups. However, the reality 
may frequently be the opposite. Non-state actors compete with state actors and frequently 
dominate them in certain areas of international law – the work of the ICC in occupying the 
field of documentary credits has particular salience here. Non-state entities dominate these 
fields because of technical expertise and policing mechanisms. In the demandeur-centric 
approach, the non-state demandeur mediates state preferences, not vice versa. 
 
 Competition can also exist at an intra-state level between various political 
institutions. Demandeur preferences are also at play in mediating this competition. All other 
things being equal, a legislature ought to prefer a convention rather than a non-legal 
agreement as it has the opportunity to participate in the former whereas it would be 
completely excluded in the latter. In terms of institutional competition, the legislature comes 
off second-best when non-legal agreements are chosen as both the other institutions, the 
executive and the judiciary have a role to play. The executive branch can sign non-legal 
agreements and courts may be able to leave their stamp on non-legal agreements which have 
been contractually incorporated and which are the subject of disputes before them. Thus the 
choice of legal versus non-legal is frequently a choice of legislative versus non-legislative 
participation. 
 
 Institutional competition can stymie effectiveness because of concerns about 
demandeurs playing too powerful a role in the drafting of an agreement. This may be behind 
concerns expressed by the European Parliament in its analysis of the Hague Securities 
Convention, “[r]eiterat[ing] the need for democratic checks on the negotiations carried on in 
the context of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.”259 The Parliament called 
for an impact study even though the European Commission had been involved in the drafting 
of the convention, and was party to the abandonment of the PRIMA principle. Regardless of 
the relative merits of the competing positions, the delay in ratification caused by the stance of 
the Parliament illustrates the need for demandeurs to be cautious in their co-opting of 
international organizations, and to pay heed to intra-state and intra-organization competition. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
 Functionalism, liberal theories, and realism have serious limitations in explaining the 
design of international commercial agreements. These theories assume that states are the 
primary actors, that law is binding and non-excludable, and that soft law is inferior to hard 
law.260 None of these assumptions appear to be central in the transnational commercial law 
area. The correlation between legality and depth predicted by functionalism is rebutted by the 
experience with the CISG where the choice of the convention form yields little benefit 
because of its dispositive nature. The prediction that soft law will be more common in arcane 
areas is rebutted by the adoption of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain 
Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary.  
 
 The liberal claim that state preferences are shaped by those of non-state actors, and 
that non-state actors will exhibit a preference for hard law does not explain the existence of 
instruments adopted by the ICC. On the contrary, the choice of hard law seems to be a 
function of the extent to which the area is conducive to self regulation. If state assistance is 
needed for regulation, hard law will result, if not, non-convention law is likely to be adopted. 
Further, demandeurs are often highly integrated and thus possess sanctioning mechanisms that 
stem from membership, negating the need for state-preference capture. Realism’s exclusive 
focus on states only offers crude explanations in the transnational commercial law context. 
 
 The demandeur-centric approach offers significant explanatory advantages over other 
theories. It demonstrates the relative primacy of demandeurs as the key motive force in 
transnational commercial law agreement design. Agreement design is thus a function of 
relative demandeur power. If demandeurs are highly integrated and do not depend on states 
for enforcement, they are more likely to opt for non-convention vehicles that contain deep 
commitments. This is exemplified by the UCP 600. To the extent that demandeurs depend on 
state enforcement, deep commitments in convention-form are likely to result if demandeurs 
are integrated and possess the ability to obtain ratification. This is exemplified by the Cape 
Town Convention. If demandeurs are integrated, but unable to obtain ratification, they are 
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likely to opt for non-convention vehicles containing deep commitments. This is exemplified 
by the agreements adopted by IATA. If demandeurs are not integrated, and lack the ability to 
obtain ratification, they are likely to opt for non-convention law containing weak 
commitments, as exemplified by the UNIDROIT Principles. The demandeur-centric approach 
presents a starting point for further empirical examination. 
 
 
